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Introduction
This thesis consists of three chapters that analyze the stability of financial
institutions, particularly that of banks. All chapters are based on joint work
with my friend and colleague Stephan Luck. The focus lies on self-fulfilling
liquidity crises that are associated with maturity transformation conducted
by financial intermediaries such as banks. The need for such maturity trans-
formation arises because, on the one hand, investors have a demand for liquid
assets and, on the other hand, investment projects require stable long-term
funding. As pointed out by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), banks are insti-
tutions that can efficiently intermediate in this environment. The maturity
mismatch induced by such intermediation makes banks prone to self-fulfilling
liquidity crises, i.e., bank runs or roll-over freezes. We show that the govern-
ment has a distinct role in ensuring the functioning of efficient maturity trans-
formation (Chapter 1). We also show that if a single government’s power is
limited, supranational agreements can help to mitigate this limitation (Chap-
ter 2). Finally, we address the problem of regulatory arbitrage and show that
safeguarding measures become ineffective if there is an opportunity to shift
intermediation into a shadow banking sector (Chapter 3).
Chapter 1 is based on Luck and Schempp (2014b) and discusses the optimal
provision of liquidity. It asks whether financial intermediaries can optimally
provide liquidity, or whether the government has a role in creating liquidity by
supplying government securities. We discuss a model in which intermediaries
optimally manage liquidity with outside rather than inside liquidity: instead
of holding liquid real assets that can be used at will, banks sell claims on long-
term projects to investors. While increasing efficiency, liquidity management
with private outside liquidity is associated with a rollover risk. This rollover
risk either keeps intermediaries from providing liquidity optimally, or it makes
the economy inherently fragile. In contrast to privately produced claims,
government bonds are not associated with coordination problems unless there
is a prospect of the government defaulting. Therefore, efficiency and stability
can be enhanced if liquidity management relies on public outside liquidity.
The main results of the first chapter are derived under the assumption
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that a government cannot default because it can commit future liquidity via
taxation. It is thus the only institution that can credibly promise to provide
liquidity in the future. However, this ability depends on the assumption that
the government has access to a sufficiently large and stable tax base. In the
next chapter, we assume that the tax base is endogenous and depends on the
performance of the financial sector and of the whole economy.
Chapter 2 is based on Luck and Schempp (2014c) and provides a model that
unifies the notion of self-fulfilling banking crises and sovereign debt crises. In
this model, a bank run can be contagious by triggering a sovereign default,
and vice versa. A deposit insurance scheme can eliminate the adverse equilib-
rium only if the government can repay its debt and credibly insure deposits,
irrespective of the performance of the financial sector. Moreover, we analyze
how banking crises and sovereign defaults can be contagious across countries.
We give conditions under which the implementation of a banking union, in-
cluding a supranational deposit insurance, prevents crises effectively and at
no cost. Finally, we discuss the current proposals for a banking union in the
euro area and argue that it should be extended by a supranational Deposit
Guarantee Scheme.
Chapter 3 is based on Luck and Schempp (2014a) and addresses the reg-
ulation of financial intermediation. While deposit insurance is effective at
excluding panic-based runs, it may also introduce moral hazard on the part
of banks and make regulation necessary. We study a banking model of matu-
rity transformation in which regulatory arbitrage induces the coexistence of
regulated commercial banks and unregulated shadow banks. We derive three
main results: First, the relative size of the shadow banking sector determines
the stability of the financial system. If the shadow banking sector is small rel-
ative to the capacity of secondary markets for shadow banks’ assets, shadow
banking is stable. In turn, if the sector grows too large, it becomes fragile:
an additional equilibrium emerges that is characterized by a panic-based run
in the shadow banking sector. Second, if regulated commercial banks them-
selves operate shadow banks, the parameter space in which a run on shadow
banks may occur is reduced. However, once the threat of a crisis reappears, a
crisis in the shadow banking sector spreads to the commercial banking sector.
Third, in the presence of regulatory arbitrage, a safety net for banks may fail
to prevent a banking crisis. Moreover, the safety net may be tested and may
eventually become costly for the regulator.
All three chapters are concerned with the self-fulfilling elements of finan-
cial crises. We find that the government has a distinct role in dealing with
such fragilities. During the 2007-09 financial crisis, fiscal authorities and cen-
2
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tral banks tried to stabilize the financial system by engaging in bail-outs and
by providing guarantees for distressed institutions. While such ex-post mea-
sures can be useful once a financial system is in a state of crisis, this thesis
contributes to the understanding of how ex-ante measures can prevent such
crises in the first place. Our models show that a fiscally strong government
can ensure efficient liquidity provision by issuing government bonds. If a
single country is fiscally weak, we show how a banking union that includes
a supranational Deposit Guarantee Scheme may be mutually beneficial for
its participants. Finally, we show how regulatory arbitrage can reintroduced
panic-based runs even in the presence of deposit insurance for regulated banks,
and how this poses severe restrictions on the government’s ability to stabilize
the financial system.
3

1
Outside Liquidity, Rollover Risk, and
Government Bonds
1.1 Introduction
Empirical evidence suggests that investors value the liquidity of government
bonds (see, e.g., Longstaff, 2004; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012).
There are various explanations for why incomplete financial markets and fi-
nancial frictions give rise to a demand for liquidity, and for government secu-
rities as means to provide such liquidity. Government bonds may be valuable
to investors as a simple medium of transfer across time, e.g., to enhance risk-
sharing (see, e.g., Gale, 1990) or to improve investment by alleviating frictions
(see, e.g., Woodford, 1990; Saint-Paul, 2005). Demand for government secu-
rities may especially arise when private liquidity provision is limited, e.g., if
moral hazard and commitment problems restrict the pledgeable income of
private agents. Publicly issued claims may guarantee the provision of liq-
uidity and reduce the need to set liquid real assets aside (Holmström and
Tirole, 1998, 2011). Moreover, it lies in the nature of government bonds that
they mitigate the adverse selection problems typically associated with liq-
uidity provision because they are free from private information (Gorton and
Pennacchi, 1990; Gorton and Ordoñez, 2013).
This chapter provides a simple but novel explanation for why government
securities are especially suited to manage liquidity needs: government securi-
5
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ties are less prone to coordination failures than privately issued claims, i.e.,
less exposed to rollover risk.
In the run-up to the recent financial crisis, financial intermediaries satisfied
liquidity needs by transforming long-term real investments into liquid claims
instead of setting liquid real assets aside. However, when the crisis unfolded
as a consequence of various shocks in the housing market, privately produced
assets stopped being liquid – leaving financial markets and intermediaries in
turmoil.1 The crisis ultimately appears as an inability of the private sector
to provide liquidity efficiently to the economy.
In our model, financial intermediaries2 optimally provide liquidity not
through holding liquid real assets that can be used at will (inside liquidity).
Instead, they optimally rely on liquidity that investors provide in exchange for
claims on future returns of long-term real investments (referred to as private
outside liquidity). The key friction of our model is that at the time of initial
investment, it impossible to contract with the potential providers of private
outside liquidity such as wholesale funding. While the reliance on outside
liquidity increases profitable long-term investment, it may be also associated
with a rollover risk. We argue that this rollover risk is inherent in liquidity
management with privately produced claims. We show that the rollover risk
may either make intermediaries refrain from providing liquidity optimally in
the first place, or it may make the economy inherently fragile. In turn, under
the assumption that the government never defaults, public claims are free
from such risk. Satisfying liquidity needs by selling government securities in
exchange for outside liquidity (referred to as public outside liquidity) may
thus enhance efficiency and stability.
We derive our results from a banking model in the tradition of Diamond
and Dybvig (1983, henceforth D&D). Demand for liquid assets arises from
an idiosyncratic liquidity risk on the part of consumers. Financial interme-
diaries provide optimal risk-sharing to consumers by offering demand-deposit
contracts. However, we alter the D&D setup by assuming that banks can sell
claims on their future returns to investors in the interim period in exchange
for outside liquidity. Banks use the proceeds to serve early withdrawing con-
sumers. This model feature is reminiscent of Holmström and Tirole (1998,
2011) and Bolton et al. (2011).
The model’s implications are the following: First, the presence of investors
1See, e.g., Hellwig (2008), Brunnermeier (2009), Krishnamurthy (2010), and Caballero
(2010).
2We use the terms “bank” and “financial intermediary” interchangeably throughout the
chapter.
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who may buy claims on future returns generally allows a reduction of the
holdings of liquid real assets in order to manage liquidity. Banks can conduct
more productive, but illiquid long-term investments. Second, we find that
intermediaries might not be able to manage liquidity optimally with privately
produced claims. Relying on outside liquidity by investors in exchange for
privately produced claims exposes an intermediary to the risk of a rollover
freeze. There is strategic complementarity between investors in their decisions
to purchase claims on intermediaries’ future returns. If no investor purchases
claims, the intermediary will be forced to conduct costly liquidation. This in
turn may make it optimal to refuse a rollover. Importantly, the rollover risk
– unlike the classical bank run problem – cannot be eliminated by a classic
deposit insurance or by a suspension of convertibility. This caused by the
friction that outside liquidity is not contractible in the initial period. The
potential rollover freeze in turn may make intermediaries either reluctant to
implement the first-best, or it may make the economy inherently fragile.
As a third result, we show that in the presence of potential coordination
failures between investors, the existence of public claims increases welfare.
These claims allow intermediaries to implement the optimal allocation with-
out exposing the economy to the risk of a rollover freeze. The reason is simple:
under the assumption that the government never defaults, government secu-
rities are never subject to a coordination problem, i.e., there is no strategic
complementarity between the investors in their decisions to purchase govern-
ment bonds. In contrast to privately produced assets, the value of government
securities is independent of the decision of investors to purchase the security
or not. By using government bonds to manage liquidity, banks can reduce in-
efficient reliance on inside liquidity while avoiding rollover risk. Consequently,
government borrowing may have non-Ricardian effects (see, e.g., Barro, 1974).
Finally, we discuss the assumption that the government can always repay
its debt. We show that once the government’s ability to repay depends on
the banking sector, a run on the banking sector may be complemented by a
run on government debt if there is public supply of liquidity. In this case,
the positive effects of public liquidity provision may vanish. We analyze the
interplay of sovereign defaults and banking crises in more depth in Chapter 2.
We use the term “outside liquidity” in the sense of Holmström and Tirole
(2011), Bolton et al. (2011), and Gourinchas and Jeanne (2012). The concept
of inside and outside liquidity is to some degree reminiscent to the definition
of inside and outside money (see, e.g., Lagos, 2006), but there are subtle
differences. Outside money is money that is not anyone’s liability, and that
is thus a net asset for the private sector. In contrast, inside money is created
7
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within the private sector, and is thus some private agent’s liability. Similarly,
inside liquidity is the liquidity that is created within a specified sector, while
outside liquidity is supplied by agents or institutions outside this sector. In
contrast to the definition of outside money, outside liquidity is mostly defined
“from the point of view of the financial sector”.3 In Bolton et al. (2011), inside
liquidity denotes the intermediary’s cash reserves, whereas the intermediary
can raise outside liquidity by selling assets to long-term investors (hedge funds
and pension funds). Thus, outside liquidity is the label for liquidity that
investors supply to banks (and thus to consumers).
This chapter is closely related to the literature on the government’s role in
providing safe assets for the purpose of liquidity management. As in the sem-
inal paper by Holmström and Tirole (1998), we allow the economy to reduce
the holdings of real assets and to issue claims on future returns in order to
manage liquidity needs. In contrast to Holmström and Tirole, the limitation
of private liquidity supply originates not from agency problems, but from co-
ordination problems. In terms of our results, this chapter is close to a series of
recent papers (Greenwood et al., 2012; Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2012; Gorton
and Ordoñez, 2013). With Gorton and Ordoñez (2013), we share the notion
that government bonds are more liquid than privately produced assets and
make the economy more stable. However, their reasoning is based on the infor-
mation sensitivity of assets.4 They show that liquidity provision by privately
produced assets may make an economy fragile, as seemingly safe assets may
become illiquid when they become information-sensitive. Government bonds
in turn are less information-sensitive and thus more liquid. With the paper by
Greenwood et al. (2012) we have in common that the government has a com-
parative advantage in bearing refinancing risk relative to the private sector,
and thus public provision of liquidity is welfare-enhancing. However, their fo-
cus is on the maturity of different securities. Finally, Gourinchas and Jeanne
(2012) provide a macroeconomic model with inside and outside liquidity. As
in our setup, a crisis occurs when private liquidity provision is insufficient and
the role of public securities for financial stability is emphasized.
The results of this chapter can also be interpreted in the light of the theory
of liquidity mismatch. Brunnermeier et al. (2013) argue that maturity trans-
formation and the associated maturity mismatch are not problematic per se.
Fragility arises only if maturity transformation also induces a liquidity mis-
match. While financing a 20 year government bond with demand deposits
3Definition in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2012); other definitions are similar.
4See Dang et al. (2013a) and Dang et al. (2013b) on information (in)sensitivity of assets
and financial crises.
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is an extreme form of maturity mismatch, it does not constitute a liquidity
mismatch as long as there is a liquid market for government bonds. In our
model, the government bonds on the banks’ balance sheets neither change
the mechanism of maturity transformation nor the liquidity mismatch, but it
substantially reduces the liquidity mismatch.
We also relate our results to recent empirical findings. In our model, liq-
uidity benefits from government bonds have real effects, consistent with the
evidence that investors value these attributes (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2012). Moreover, public provision of liquidity reduces the fragility
in our setup, which is in line with the finding that financial crises are more
likely when little public debt is available (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen,
2013) and financial crises seem to be related to excessive private debt rather
than public debt (Jordà et al., 2013; Schularick, 2014).
This chapter is also very closely related to theories of banking, in which
intermediaries optimally rely less on inside liquidity and more on sales of
claims on long-term investments, such as the model by Bolton et al. (2011).
This model is concerned with the timing of trade in the presence of uncertainty
and asymmetric information, while we focus on the coordination failures that
may be associated with outside liquidity.
Finally, this chapter contributes to the literature on liquidity provision by
financial intermediaries. D&D have argued that financial intermediaries can
provide optimal risk-sharing to consumers and allow them to benefit from
profitable long-term investments by offering demand-deposit contracts.5 In
contrast, we argue that the ability of financial intermediaries to provide liq-
uidity is limited. We are far from being the first to address the problems
of liquidity provision by intermediaries. The banking literature has already
produced various arguments. It has been argued that the ability of banks
to provide risk-sharing in the presence of financial markets is very limited
(Jacklin, 1987; Farhi et al., 2009).6 Especially when consumers are able to
adjust their portfolio, liquidity provision may be harmed (von Thadden, 1998).
Moreover, banks may be unable to implement the first-best through demand-
deposit contracts in the presence of macroeconomic interest rate risk (Hellwig,
1994).7 Under aggregate risk and in the presences of moral hazard, financial
intermediaries may not be able to insure firms against liquidity shocks either
(Holmström and Tirole, 1998). The creation of liquidity through interbank
5On the optimality of intermediaries of liquidity provider, see also, e.g., Gorton and Pen-
nacchi (1990), Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Diamond and Rajan (2001), and Kashyap
et al. (2002).
6See also Diamond (1997) and Fecht (2004).
7See also Allen and Gale (1998) on this point.
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trade may also be limited if banks are unable to diversify the liquidity risk of
their consumers (Bhattacharya and Gale, 1987).
Our argument, however, is neither based on agency problems nor on aggre-
gate uncertainty. We argue that liquidity management with privately issued
claims creates a coordination problem between those investors who could pro-
vide liquidity. A memorable insight from the seminal contributions by Bryant
(1980) and D&D is that liquidity provision may be associated with the exis-
tence of run equilibria and make an economy inherently fragile.8 Importantly,
the rollover problem in our setup differs from the classical bank run problem.
We show that the coordination problem cannot be eliminated by a deposit
insurance nor by a suspension of convertibility. Ultimately, the rollover risk
associated with optimal private liquidity provision may prevent the imple-
mentation of the optimal allocation in the first place. This chapter stands
in contrast to models arguing that banks are especially suited to provide liq-
uidity because of their fragile capital structure. Amongst others, Calomiris
and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2001, 2005) argue that the frag-
ile nature of bank balance sheets disciplines bank managers and thus allows
overcoming commitment problems associated with liquidity provision. In con-
trast, we argue that the potential rollover risk may cause banks to refrain from
supplying liquidity in an optimal fashion in the first place.
We proceed as follows: In Section 1.2, we introduce the general setup and
derive the first-best allocation and show how it can be implemented by banks.
In Section 1.3, we investigate how the first-best and its implementation change
if we introduce outside liquidity. Section 1.4 shows how the rollover risk
associated with privately liquidity supply influences the stability and efficiency
of banks. In Section 1.5, we demonstrate why the provision of public liquidity
by the government is superior to the private case. Finally, we use our model
to evaluate the liquidity regulation proposed in Basel III in Section 1.6.
1.2 Intermediation with Inside Liquidity
Consider an economy that goes through a sequence of three dates, t ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
There is a single good that can be used for consumption as well as for invest-
8Following the seminal contributions by Bryant and Diamond and Dybvig, a vast literature
on bank runs evolved. See, e.g., the literature regarding information-based runs (Jacklin
and Bhattacharya, 1988), models with positive probability of bank runs (Postlewaite
and Vives, 1987; Chari and Jagannathan, 1988; Allen and Gale, 1998; Rochet and
Vives, 2004; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005), models with interbank contagion (Allen
and Gale, 2000; Dasgupta, 2004; Uhlig, 2010), runs in repurchase agreements (Martin
et al., 2014), and dynamic runs (He and Xiong, 2012).
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ment. Moreover, there are two investment technologies that we refer to as
assets. The economy is populated by risk-averse consumers who face an id-
iosyncratic liquidity risk.
Consumers
There is a continuum of ex ante identical consumers with mass one. Each
consumer is endowed with e0 units of the good in t = 0. There are two types
of consumers, denoted by θi ∈ {0, 1}. The type determines the consumer’s
intertemporal preference for consumption in periods one and two. With prob-
ability pi, consumer i is an “impatient consumer” who needs to consume in
t = 1, denoted by θi = 1. With probability (1 − pi), she is a “patient con-
sumer” who is indifferent between consumption at both dates, denoted by
θi = 0. Initially, consumers do not know their type; their probability of being
type 1 is identical and independent. In period one, each consumer privately
learns his type. This private revelation can be considered as a liquidity shock.
A consumption profile (c1, c2) gives a consumer i a utility of
U(c1, c2, θi) = θiu(c1) + (1− θi)u(c1 + c2), (1.1)
where the “baseline” utility u : R+ → R is an increasing and strictly concave
function that is twice continuously differentiable and satisfies Inada condi-
tions, u′(0) = +∞ and u′(+∞) = 0. For each consumer, the ex-ante expected
utility is given by EU(c1, c2) = piu(c1) + (1− pi)u(c1 + c2).
Notice that the attributes “patient” and “impatient” characterize the con-
sumer’s exogenous type which determines his preference, denoted by θi. In
contrast, the attributes “late” and “early” will characterize the timing of con-
sumption which is endogenous: An “early consumer” consumes in t = 1, while
a “late consumer” consumes in t = 2.
Assets
There are two different assets (investment technologies) available in t = 0: a
short asset (storage technology), and a long asset (production technology).
The short asset transforms one unit of the good at time t into one unit of
the good at t + 1, effectively storing the good. The long asset promises a
higher expected return in the long run. However, this asset is considered to
be illiquid as it can only be liquidated with a substantial discount in t = 1.
The long asset is represented by a continuum of investment projects. An
investment project is a metaphor for an entrepreneur who is endowed with a
production technology but has no endowment of goods for investment. Each
consumer has access to exactly one project (or equivalently is matched with
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exactly one entrepreneur). Each investment project yields a stochastic return
of Ri units in t = 2 for each unit invested in t = 0. The return Ri is the
realization of an independently and identically distributed random variable
R˜, characterized by a probability distribution F . F is continuous and strictly
increasing on a compact interval with minimum R > 0 and maximum R, with
E[Ri] = R > 1. We assume that the realization of an investment project’s
long-term return Ri is privately revealed to the project’s financier in t = 1. As
we will shortly see, the idiosynchratic risk implies that financial intermediaries
dominate a financial markets solution in terms of welfare.
Finally, an investment project may be physically liquidated prematurely at
a rate ` ∈ (0, 1/R) in t = 1, yielding a liquidation return of `Ri units. The
liquidation return of a project thus depends on the project’s stochastic long-
term return. However, the ratio of liquidation return to long-term return is
constant and equal to `.
1.2.1 First-Best Allocation
The allocation of consumption across different consumer types and different
periods is denoted by {c1(θ), c2(θ)}θ∈{0,1}. The unconstrained optimum results
from the social planner’s first-best problem, which is given by
max
{c1(θ),c2(θ)}θ∈{0,1}
piu(c1(1)) + (1− pi)u(c1(0) + c2(0)) (1.2)
subject to
pi
(
c1(1) +
c2(1)
R
)
+ (1− pi)
(
c1(0) +
c2(0)
R
)
≤ e0. (1.3)
Equation (1.3) is the feasibility condition, resulting from the initial investment
constraint in t = 0 and the two budget constraints in period one and two.
In the first-best, it holds that
c2(1) = c1(0) = 0. (1.4)
The late consumption levels of patient and the early consumption level of
impatient consumers are then given by the following first-order condition and
budget constraint:
u′(c1(1)) = Ru′(c2(0)), (1.5)
pic1(1) + (1− pi)c2(0)
R
= e0. (1.6)
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The optimal allocation is thus characterized by the trade-off between insur-
ance against liquidity risk (investment in storage) and productive investment
(investment in the long assets).
1.2.2 Diamond & Dybvig (1983)
The model described above resembles the essential features of the framework
of the D&D model. Therefore, we briefly review the key results of the seminal
D&D model. The first important result is that a competitive financial market
generally fails to implement the first-best allocation. In contrast, a competi-
tive banking sector or a representative bank can implement the first-best. It
is assumed that the law of large numbers applies on the bank level. That is,
there is neither uncertainty on the fraction of consumers being impatient, pi,
nor on the return of the portfolio of long assets, R.
A bank that aims at maximizing consumers’ expected utility thus needs to
maximize (1.2) subject to the feasibility constraint, and because the type of
consumers is private information, the constrained efficient program contains
two additional restrictions. The allocation of consumption must be such that
no consumer has an incentive to misreport his type in the interim period:
u(c1(1)) ≥ u(c1(0)), (1.7)
u(c1(0) + c2(0)) ≥ u(c1(1) + c2(1)). (1.8)
Constraint (1.7) ensures that a impatient consumer has no incentive to misre-
port, while (1.8) ensures that a patient consumer does not want to misreport.
Adding constraints (1.7) and (1.8) to the first-best problem, however, does not
change the solution because the constraints are not binding in the first-best.
This implies that the first-best is in fact implementable given the friction of
unobservable types. The second-best thus coincides with the first-best.
The proposed mechanism, a bank representing a contestable banking sector,
proceeds as follows (see also Figure 1.1): In t = 0, the endowment of all
consumers is collected. In exchange the bank offers a demand-deposit contract
that allows a consumer to withdraw c∗1 units in t = 1 and c∗2 units in t = 2.
The bank chooses cDD1 and cDD2 such that u′(cDD1 ) = Ru′(cDD2 ) which is the
FOC for the first-best allocation, see Equation (1.5). R > 1 and concavity of
u imply that cDD1 ≤ cDD2 , and thus Equations (1.7) and (1.8) are satisfied and
it is incentive-compatible for patient consumers to withdraw only in t = 2.
The bank invests e0− I = picDD1 in the storage technology and the remaining
funds I = e0−picDD1 in the long asset, which implies that Equation (1.6) holds.
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t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Bank Bank
picDD1
Bank
I = e0 − picDD1 = (1− pi)cDD2 /R
Consumers
e0
Consumers
picDD1
Consumers
(1− pi)cDD2
Figure 1.1: Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The graph illustrates investment and the
flow of goods (solid arrows). Initially, consumers deposit their endowment at the
bank. Banks invest the endowment in the long and in the short asset. In periods one
and two, early and late consumers are served with the returns of the short and the
long asset, respectively.
The representative bank is thus able to implement the first-best allocation.9
The second important result is that there is also a second type of equilibrium
in t = 1. If all patient consumers desire withdrawing at once, the bank will
be left with assets of picDD1 + `(1− picDD1 ) < 1 which is typically strictly less
than its total liabilities in t = 1, which amount to cDD1 .10 The bank will
therefore be insolvent in t = 1 and no funds for patient consumers will be left
over in t = 2. It is thus optimal for all patient consumers to withdraw and a
bank run may constitute an equilibrium in the interim period. In fact, there
are two subgame-perfect Nash-Equilibria in t = 0, one in which the bank is
established, and a second one in which consumers refuse to deposit funds in
the banks as they expect a bank run in t = 1.
Finally, the third result of the D&D model is that the adverse run equi-
librium can be eliminated by two policy measures: either the banks should
commit to suspending convertibility after paying out an overall amount of
picDD1 , or the government should provide a deposit insurance which guaran-
tees cDD1 units for each consumer in t = 1, irrespective of the banks being
solvent or not. In both cases, the adverse equilibrium can be eliminated at
9Note that the optimality of the banking solution relies on a no-trading restriction of
consumers in t = 1; see Jacklin (1987) and more recently Farhi et al. (2009).
10The run equilibrium exists whenever cDD1 ≥ 1. This condition is typically satisfied
through the assumption that the coefficient of relative risk-aversion is larger than one,
i.e., −cu′′(c)/u′(c) > 1 for every c.
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no cost.11
1.3 Intermediation with Outside Liquidity
We now introduce a new type of agents whom we refer to as “investors”.
Investors can provide banks or consumers with liquidity in the interim period
which we refer to as “outside liquidity”. In the following, we analyze how the
optimal allocation is altered by allowing for interim outside liquidity, and how
the new first-best allocation may be implemented by a banking sector.
Assume that there is a continuum of investors with mass α > 1. Investors
have no endowment initially, but with a probability 1/α an investor j has
an endowment of e1,j = e1 in period one. Otherwise, her endowment is zero.
Therefore, the mass of investors that has a positive endowment is equal to
one, and the overall endowment of all investors is e1 =
∫
e1,jdj. We assume
that e1 > piRe0. As we will see, this condition assures that the supply of
outside liquidity is never limited by a binding resource constraint.
The key friction of private outside liquidity is the following: We assume that
it is the investor’s private information whether she has a positive endowment
in period one. Thus, investors cannot write enforceable contracts in t = 0,
which are contingent on whether they have a positive endowment in t =
1. Because investors cannot contract in t = 0, we will only consider their
behavior form period t = 1 onwards. Furthermore, we have to consider only
those investors who have a positive endowment.
We assume that investors have no market power, and that they are indif-
ferent between consuming in periods one and two. Their utility is given by
v(cˆ1+ cˆ2), where cˆt is her consumption in period t and v : R+ → R is a strictly
increasing function. Consequently, they are willing to invest their complete
endowment e1 as long as the gross return in t = 2 is at least e1.
1.3.1 First-best with Outside Liquidity
We now derive the new first-best allocation, given that outside liquidity is
available in the interim period. The social planner’s objective function, speci-
fied by the maximization problem (1.2), remains unchanged. The objective is
11Observe that for suspension of convertibility to be an effective measure there must not
be aggregate uncertainty about the actual fraction of consumers who withdraw early.
Moreover, suspension of convertibility is also ineffective if withdrawing depositors are
paid out by new depositors, see the extension of the D&D setup to an overlapping
generation setting by Qi (1994).
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maximizing the consumers’ welfare, whereas investors’ utility does not enter
our welfare measure. However, we assume that even the social planner cannot
transfer funds from investors to consumers without restrictions. Because in-
vestors’ welfare does not directly enter into the objective function, we require
that investors must be willing to participate.12 The aggregate transfer from
investors to consumers in period one is denoted by d1 ≤ e1, and d2 denotes
the reverse transfer in period two. Investors’ participation constraint is given
by d2 ≥ d1. It is straightforward that this constraint will be binding in the
optimum, i.e., d1 = d2 will hold in the following.
The first-best program with outside liquidity is slightly different from the
one in the previous section. We now explicitly consider the budget constraints
in each period. The variable I ∈ [0, e0] again denotes the investment in the
long asset, and an amount e0 − I is invested in storage. Let d denote the
amount of interim liquidity (i.e., the amount of liquidity that is transferred
between investors and consumers), where d = d1 = d2 ≤ e1.
The budget constraints for the two periods are given by
e0 − I + d ≥ pic1(1) + (1− pi)c1(0), (1.9)
RI ≥ pic2(1) + (1− pi)c2(0) + d. (1.10)
Constraint (1.9) ensures that, in t = 1, the payments to consumers do
not exceed the sum of inside liquidity (storage) and interim outside liquidity.
Constraint (1.10) ensures that, in t = 2, the sum of payments to consumers
and the repayment of interim outside liquidity does not exceed the return
from investment in the long asset.
Proposition 1.1 (First-best). In the presence of outside liquidity, the con-
sumers’ first-best consumption allocation is given by c1(1) = c2(0) = Re0, and
c1(0) = c2(1) = 0. It is attained by choosing I = e0 and d = piRe0.
The fundamental insight of Proposition 1.1 is that the D&D allocation,
in which consumption levels in both periods are strictly less than Re0, can
strictly be improved upon.13 The social planner can make full use of the
productive long asset because the supply of liquidity in the interim period
12In our setup, a comparison of consumers’ and investors’ utility does not appear meaning-
ful. We are neither interested in the allocation of risk, nor in redistribution of wealth
between the two groups of agents. We interpret the investor’s participation constraint
rather as a resource constraint that as a friction. It thus appears adequate to refer to
the optimum as the “first-best”.
13This result is reminiscent of the finding by Qi (1994), who shows that storage may be
redundant in a overlapping-generation version of the D&D model.
16
1.3 Intermediation with Outside Liquidity
removes the need to invest in storage. In the model with outside liquidity, the
trade-off between liquidity insurance (provided through the short-asset, i.e.,
inside liquidity) and return (long-asset) can be solved such that consumption
is perfectly smoothed by making full use of the productive technology.
Observe that the first-best allocation is not unique if the endowment of
investors strictly exceeds the amount that is given to impatient consumers
in the interim period, e1 > piRe0. Because early and late consumption are
perfect substitutes for patient consumers, impatient consumers could receive
some positive payment in t = 1, as long as their total amount of consumption
remains unchanged. Without loss of generality, we focus on the solution
presented in Proposition 1.1 in the following, i.e., impatient consumers only
consume late.14
1.3.2 Efficient Banking
We now show that the first-best allocation in the model with outside liquidity
can be implemented by an institution that is reminiscent of a financial inter-
mediary that signs demand-deposit contracts with consumers in period zero.
In contrast to the situation without outside liquidity, a bank now only invests
in the long asset and raises liquid funds in the interim period. It raises funds
by issuing claims and selling them to investors. We will refer to those claims
as debt.15
As in the D&D setup, one may think of the banking sector as a contestable
market. The assumption of free entry and the resulting perfect competition
imply that financial intermediaries implies contracts that maximize the ex-
pected utility of consumers.16 Again, the law of large numbers is assumed
to apply on the bank level, resulting in a gross return of R on the long asset
with certainty, and a fraction of early impatient consumers of exactly pi.
Therefore, banks can implement the first-best in the following way (see also
Figure 1.2): banks collect the total endowment e0 of all consumers as deposits
in period zero against the promise that consumers can withdraw Re0 units at
any time. In order to serve their obligations, banks invest all of the economy’s
t = 0 endowment in the long assets, transforming them in Re0 units in t = 2.
In the interim period, banks sell claims d on their portfolio of long assets to
14Notice that this allocation can be attained by choosing any d ∈ [piRe0, e1].
15Notice that the bank could likewise issue equity claims. As we frame the problem as
one of rollover, however, we refer to the claims as debt claims without giving a specific
microeconomic reasoning why debt is preferred over equity.
16Alternatively, one may assume that the banking sector is a mechanism or a coalition of
consumers that maximizes the consumers’ expected utility.
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investors. Because banks are assumed to be able to diversify the liquidity
and the return risk, there is no adverse selection in the market for claims in
the interim period. Therefore, the investors’ participation constraint implies
that banks can sell their claims at par. Banks will sell claims with a total
value of piRe0, and only impatient consumers withdraw early. The issuance
of claims is equivalent to a rollover of debt, as the liability towards depositors
is replaced by liabilities towards investors.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Bank Bank Bank
e0
Consumers
e0
Consumers
piRe0
Consumers
(1− pi)Re0
Investors
piRe0d
Investors
d piRe0
Figure 1.2: Private Outside Liquidity. The graph illustrates investment and the flow
of goods (solid arrows) and claims (dashed arrows). Claims associated with demand-
deposit contracts are not depicted. In t = 0, consumers deposit their endowment e0
at the banks. Banks invest the endowment in the long asset, transforming e0 units
of the good into Re0 units. In the interim period, early consumers are served by
selling claims d to investors. In t = 2, banks redeem the claims of investors and
repay investors and late consumers using the returns of the long asset.
Proposition 1.2 (Implementation of the first-best). The first-best allocation
c1(1) = c2(0) = Re0 can be implemented in a demand deposit economy. Banks
invest only in the long asset. Banks serve withdrawing consumers in the in-
terim period by issuing claims on future returns and selling these to investors
in exchange for outside liquidity.
The implementation of the first-best allocation thus involves privately pro-
duced assets. Instead of investing in storage in t = 0, financial intermediaries
issue claims on their future returns in the interim period. The proceeds from
selling these to investors are used to serve withdrawing consumers. This al-
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lows intermediaries to increase the investment in the long asset and thus to
promise higher payments to consumers.
As in the D&D setup, the first-best allocation cannot be implemented by
trade in a financial market in the interim period. The reason is somewhat
different, however. In our model, the main reason why financial markets
cannot implement the first-best is that consumers cannot insure themselves
against idiosyncratic return risk. For such an insurance, contingent contracts
between consumers or between consumers and investors are required, which
are not feasible because of the unobservability of consumers’ returns, liquidity
needs and investors’ endowments. For a detailed analysis, see the Appendix
1.A. Because the idiosyncratic return risk restricts the benefits of side-trading,
it can be interpreted as trading restriction in the sense of (Jacklin, 1987; von
Thadden, 1998).
The fragility associated with this implementation will be discussed in the
next section.
1.4 Private Outside Liquidity and Rollover
Risk
In this section, we show that a bank may face a rollover freeze if it relies on
raising liquidity by issuing claims in the interim period. It turns out that the
efficient private provision of liquidity is inherently fragile. Therefore, banks
might refrain from relying on outside liquidity. Instead, they might rely on
the inefficient storage technology and offer the D&D contract.
1.4.1 Rollover Freeze
Consider the subgame starting in the interim period, given that banks have
invested the complete endowment in the long asset. In this subgame, con-
sumers are endowed with a demand-deposit contract promising Re0 units in
either period, and banks issue claims on their future returns in order to serve
withdrawing consumers. Consumers have the choice to withdraw early or to
wait, and investors have the choice whether to buy claims on bank assets. In
the previous section, we saw that there exists an efficient equilibrium of this
subgame in which consumers do not run on banks and investors roll over the
banks’ debt. However, there are strategic complementarities between agents,
giving rise to multiple equilibria. As in the D&D model, there is a strategic
complementarity between consumers whether or not to withdraw early. In the
model with outside liquidity, an additional strategic complementarity arises
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between investors concerning their decision whether to buy claims on bank as-
sets and thus to roll over the banks’ debt. Furthermore, there is also strategic
complementarity across these two groups of agents. In the following, however,
we will only focus on the strategic complementarity between investors.
In order to understand the rollover freeze, consider a situation in which
no investor is willing to purchase bank claims. Let us first assume that only
impatient consumers withdraw early. In this case, banks will need to liquidate
a positive fraction z = min[pi/`, 1] of their long assets at the inefficient rate
`R in order to serve impatient consumers with an amount of piRe0 units. This
liquidation implies that the bank will only be left with (1 − z)Re0 in t = 2.
Therefore, the bank will not have sufficient funds at hand in order to serve its
patient customers or any investors in t = 2. Therefore, an individual investor
will not provide any liquidity in t = 1, as banks will be insolvent in t = 2.
This implies that even if consumers behave diligently and do not run on the
bank, a rollover freeze always constitutes an equilibrium.
This consideration also leads to the insight that the standard measures to
prevent inefficient liquidation and thus financial crises, such as deposit in-
surance (DI) or suspension of convertibility (SoC), become ineffective. The
reason is that these policies are only targeted at breaking the strategic com-
plementarity between depositors – they are concerned with the demand for
liquidity, but not with its supply. The DI may keep patient consumers from
running on banks, but a bank run is not the only way a bank can become
illiquid and insolvent once a bank relies on outside liquidity. Banks may in
fact experience a rollover freeze as the deposit insurance does not alter the
strategic complementarity between investors. Moreover, SoC is also ineffec-
tive. By suspending convertibility, banks can limit the amount they pay out
to early consumers, which induces stability in the D&D model because it elim-
inates the need for liquidation. However, if banks rely on outside liquidity,
this measure does not prevent liquidation in case of a rollover freeze, inducing
consumers to run.
Lemma 1.1. In the t = 1 subgame, a rollover freeze by investors constitutes
a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, a rollover freeze may occur independently of
whether there is a bank run or not, and irrespectively of the existence of a
credible deposit insurance or of banks committing to suspend convertibility.
In the following, we show that the fact that there may be a rollover freeze in
t = 1 makes banks either refrain from providing the efficient level of liquidity
or it will expose the economy to the rollover risk. In the latter case, the
economy will be fragile despite DI or SoC.
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1.4.2 Inefficient Liquidity Provision
Because the subgame of the interim period has an efficient as well as an ad-
verse equilibrium, the whole game (starting in period zero) has at least one
additional, inefficient subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. While there might
be a continuum of equilibria, we are interested in the generic case where
investors coordinate on a rollover freeze. In a subgame-perfect Nash equi-
librium, consumers and banks anticipate not being able to raise any outside
liquidity in the interim period. Given that outside liquidity is not available
in the interim period, banks have to rely on storage again. The constraint
efficient allocation is given by the Diamond-Dybvig allocation described in
Section 1.2.2.
Proposition 1.3. The model has a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in which
investors do not roll over bank debt, consumers do not run on banks, and banks
implement the Diamond-Dybvig consumption allocation, given by c1(1) = cDD1
and c2(0) = cDD2 , and c1(0) = c2(1) = 0.
We have seen that if banks rely on raising outside liquidity by issuing claims
on their future return, they are exposed to the risk of investors coordinating
on a rollover freeze. The most efficient allocation entails full exposure to the
rollover risk resulting from the coordination problem. If banks fear a rollover
freeze, they might completely shy away from relying on outside liquidity,
rather implementing the less efficient D&D allocation.
The reasoning in Proposition 1.3 is in fact very similar to the argument in
the D&D model that if a bank run was expected in t = 1, consumers would
not be willing to deposit their endowment in the bank in t = 0. However,
it is important to notice that the adverse equilibrium cannot be eliminated
by the standard measures (DI or SoC) in our model. This is due to the key
friction of non-contractible private outside liquidity. One may assume that the
government offers a credible DI or banks may commit to SoC. In our setup,
this will not eliminate the fragility associated with the efficient provision of
liquidity. In fact, if there is no credible DI, a third equilibrium may exist in
which investors would not roll over bank debt and investors would run on the
bank, which is why no bank is founded in the first place. In turn, if there is a
credible DI, this equilibrium does not exist. However, the DI is tested in the
equilibrium of Proposition 1.3 and may be costly for the institution providing
it.
Finally, Proposition 1.3 can be seen as an argument for why liquidity pro-
vision by banks may be limited in general. We argue hat efficient liquidity
provision rests on reliance on outside liquidity. However, privately produced
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assets may not be able to ensure the provision of outside liquidity. Due to
the rollover risk associated with privately produced assets, financial interme-
diaries may thus not be able to implement the optimal allocation. This line
of argument stands in contrast to models arguing that banks are especially
suited to provide banking services because of their fragile capital structure
(Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Diamond and Rajan, 2001). In our setup, the
fragility in the interim period can cause banks to refrain from supplying liq-
uidity in an optimal fashion.
1.4.3 Fragility
Until this point, we have tied our hands by assuming that investors cannot
coordinate their behavior on something that is not observed or not initially
contractible. Formally, this means that investors cannot play a strategy by
which they condition their action on a public signal that is only revealed in
the interim period. This implies that a rollover freeze will never occur in
a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Either banks suc-
cessfully rely on outside liquidity because they know that a rollover will be
successful, or they anticipate a rollover freeze and rely on the storage tech-
nology. In equilibrium, the rollover “risk” is degenerate, as it either occurs
with a probability of zero, or it occurs with a probability of one, but has no
effect.17
We now want to consider a setup where investors can coordinate on a
rollover freeze. The notion of coordination problems in the tradition of the
D&D model is that depositors decide in the interim period whether to with-
draw, thus coordinating on whether to run on the bank only after the invest-
ment decision has been made. Formally, the concept of subgame perfection
requires agents to choose a strategy in period zero. Therefore, uncertainty
about the action in t = 1 can only prevail if there exists a public signal upon
which agents can condition their action. A popular illustration of such a
coordination device is the concept of sunspots.18
We adopt this notion and assume that with some exogenous probability
p ∈ (0, 1) a sunspot occurs, and investors play a strategy that prescribes not
17There exists no equilibrium in which investors play mixed strategies and banks rely on
rollover. While this might seem strange, it is worth mentioning that investors play
a weakly dominated strategy in the “rollover equilibrium”. As soon as we introduce
marginal net profits for investors, rollover stops being weakly dominated and an equi-
librium in mixed strategies arises.
18See Cooper and Ross (1998) for an analysis of the D&D setup with sunspots.
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to roll over the banks’ liabilities in case of this sunspot.19 We restrict our
attention to the two extremes where the probability of a rollover freeze is
either close to one or close to zero.
Proposition 1.4. As the probability of a rollover freeze converges to one,
i.e., p → 1, the optimal investment converges towards the Diamond-Dybvig
case, I(p) → IDD. Furthermore, there exists a threshold p` ∈ (0, 1) such
that for p ≤ p`, it is optimal fully to rely on private outside liquidity storage,
I∗(p) = e0.
For the proof of Proposition 1.4, see the Appendix. The result, however, is
very intuitive as it rests on the insight of the following trade-off: On the one
hand, efficiency can be attained by choosing high investment in the illiquid
but profitable long-term technology. Because banks thereby rely on outside
liquidity, this is associated with a high rollover risk. On the other hand,
stability can be attained if banks are not exposed to rollover risk. To this end,
banks make use of the storage technology and thus rely on inside liquidity. In
other words, the trade-off is between strong maturity mismatch and narrow
banking.
If the sunspot probability p is sufficiently high, banks will implement the
D&D allocation. Banks and consumers know that each unit of early con-
sumption that is not covered by investment in the storage technology has to
be raised by liquidating long assets in case of a rollover freeze. Therefore,
banks will finance every unit of early consumption by using inside liquid-
ity and the optimal allocation under this constraint is the D&D allocation.
In contrast, if the probability of a rollover freeze is sufficiently small, banks
choose full exposure to rollover risk by only investing in the long asset, and
implement a consumption level of Re0 for both consumer types. This im-
plies that banks have to engage in substantial liquidation in case of a rollover
freeze, but given that this risk is very low, they are willing to accept this risk.
It is worth noticing that even if a rollover freeze occurs with a positive
probability, it may still be optimal that banks fully rely on outside liquidity.
In this case, the economy is inherently fragile and a financial crisis may unfold
in equilibrium if investors coordinate on a rollover freeze.
19We do not model the underlying reason for the occurrence of these sunspots, and if we
did, their occurrence would probably depend upon the banks’ behavior.
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1.5 Public Outside Liquidity
In Section 1.3, we showed that optimal liquidity management does not rely on
inside liquidity, but rather on outside liquidity. Building on this, Section 1.4
revealed that the efficient allocation can be implemented by banks issuing
private claims and relying on the rollover of debt. However, outside liquidity in
exchange for privately produced assets is associated with a rollover risk. The
anticipation of a rollover freeze can lead to inefficient investment choices ex-
ante. We now analyze how this friction could be overcome. In particular, we
ask whether the government can mitigate the problem by providing liquidity.
In general, a government has the ability – unlike private agents – to commit
future income via taxation or money creation. This makes claims against a
public authority inherently safer than claims produced by the private sector.
In the first part of this section, we therefore assume that the government never
defaults. In this case, we show that the government can increase welfare by
issuing a public claim that can be used by banks to manage liquidity. In
the second part of this section, we relax the assumption that the government
cannot default and show that the benefits from public provision of liquidity
may vanish.
1.5.1 Liquidity Management and Government Bonds
Let us assume that the government never defaults. Consider the following
mechanism in which the government provides liquidity by issuing a govern-
ment bond (Figure 1.3): In t = 0, consumers deposit their endowment e0 at
a bank in exchange for a demand-deposit contract allowing the consumer to
withdraw Re0 in either period. Banks receive government bonds that promise
a payment of b units by the government in t = 2. In exchange for the b gov-
ernment bonds, banks write a debt contract with the government, promising
to pay d units to the government in t = 2. Banks and government will lend
and borrow such that d = b ≥ piRe0. Effectively, banks are expanding their
balance sheets by an amount of b.
In t = 1, banks sell piRe0 units of government bonds to the investors and use
the resulting liquidity to serve withdrawing consumers. In t = 2, the govern-
ment has due gross liabilities of b units, necessary to redeem the government
bonds. An amount of piRe0 is paid to investors. The difference of b − piRe0
units is a gross liability towards banks, resulting from the government bonds
they did not sell to investors in t = 1. However, the banks also owe d = b
units to the government. Therefore, they have a net liability of piRe0 units
towards the government. The banks have an overall return of Re0 from the
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long assets which is used to pay out (1−pi)Re0 units to the patient consumers
and piRe0 to the government.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Government Government
Bank
db
Bank Bank
e0
piRe0d
Consumers
e0
Consumers
piRe0
Consumers
(1–pi)Re0
Investors
piRe0b
Investors
piRe0b
Figure 1.3: Public Outside Liquidity. The graph illustrates investment and the flow
of goods and claims. In this graph, we assume that b = d = pie0R. The dotted arrow
denotes the investment in assets and thus the “transfer” of goods between periods.
The solid arrows denote the flow of goods. The dashed arrows denote the flow of net
claims. For simplicity, the claims of consumers towards banks (resulting from the
demand-deposit contracts) are left out.
Proposition 1.5. If the government provides government bonds in t = 0,
the banks are able to implement the first-best consumption allocation, given
by c1(1) = c2(0) = Re0 and c1(0) = c2(1) = 0. Furthermore, the rollover risk
is eliminated and the economy has a unique equilibrium.
By expanding their balance sheet, the banks implement the first-best al-
location while the rollover risk is completely eliminated. Even if all other
investors refused to buy government bonds, this would not influence the in-
centives of an individual investor. Public outside liquidity eliminates the
coordination problem concerning the supply of liquidity by investors. Note
though that public liquidity provision as described does not address the coor-
dination problem between consumers concerning their withdrawal decisions.
However, given that there is public outside liquidity, a bank run equilibrium
can be eliminated by the standard measures, i.e., by introducing a deposit
insurance or allowing banks to suspend convertibility. This is important as
we saw in the previous section that these measures are ineffective as long as
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the rollover problem is not addressed, but in this context they are effective at
eliminating the coordination problem.
The central reason for the stability is that by assumption the government’s
solvency, unlike that of a bank, does not depend on the behavior of investors.
This eliminates any strategic considerations of investors when deciding to
purchase government bonds in the interim period. Therefore, multiplicity of
equilibria vanishes once government securities are used for liquidity manage-
ment.20
Observe that there are alternative implementations of the first-best alloca-
tion to the one shown in Figure 1.3. There are two obvious alternatives. First,
the government could insure all current and future bank liabilities ex-ante.
Second, the government could provide liquidity itself in the interim period.
Both mechanisms are equivalent in terms of the results in our setup, as they
also eliminate the fragility and thereby enhance efficiency. However, we ar-
gue that both alternatives may not be equally desirable as they may be more
problematic in a richer setup in which other issues such as agency problems
may arise. Insuring bank liabilities may give rise to certain risks on behalf
of the bank (e.g., risk-shifting) and creditors (e.g., weak disciplining effects).
Moreover, if the government actively manages liquidity by lending directly
to banks when they need funds, i.e., in a crisis, this may lead to excessive
maturity mismatch as in, e.g., Farhi and Tirole (2012). We discuss these two
issues in more depth in Section 6.
1.5.2 Government Solvency
So far, we have made the extreme assumption that the government is always
able to repay its debt, irrespectively of what investors do and of whether there
is a banking crisis. This assumption gives government bonds the important
characteristic of being immune against rollover risk. We now relax this as-
sumption in two different ways. First, we allow the government to default with
some exogenous probability. We show that, in this case, public liquidity pro-
vision may still be optimal. Second, we assume that the government’s ability
to repay debt is endogenous and depends on the performance of the banking
sector. In this case, the benefits from public liquidity provision vanish.
Assume first the government defaults with some positive probability which
is given exogenously. This is not necessarily detrimental to efficiency and
20This is reminiscent of how multiplicity of equilibria is eliminated in the Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) model when government bonds are introduced (see p. 515 in Tirole,
2010).
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stability. Under the condition that investors are risk-neutral, and that the
government’s solvency is only revealed after t = 1, the optimal allocation
could still be implemented. Under these conditions, the value of government
bonds is still independent of the behavior of the investors. Thus, even if
there is an exogenous default probability, there is no risk of a coordination
failure between investors. Government bonds would be traded at the fair price
(under par), and the government debt must be chosen such that its expected
repayment equals the banks’ liabilities towards the government. If we require
the debt contracts between the banks and the government to be budget-
balanced in expectation, the implementation could be as follows: Assume that
the government defaults with probability ρ and repays nothing in this case.
The government still holds a claim of d = piRe0 against the banks, whereas
the banks hold claims with a face value of b = d/ρ = piRe0/ρ against banks.
When selling these claims to investors, the fair value is given by d = piRe0.
Let us now relax the exogeneity assumption and go to the other extreme.
Assume that the government can only repay its debt if banks are solvent and
thus fully serve their liabilities towards the government d. We thus relax
the assumption that the government has access to exogenous funds, e.g., via
taxation. In this setup, all features of the setup without government bonds
reappear. The equilibrium of the t = 1 subgame still exists in which investors
roll over debt, and one equilibrium where they do not. The whole game thus
still has a subgame-perfect equilibrium that implements the first-best. How-
ever, this equilibrium is not unique – there also exists an equilibrium of the
t = 1 subgame where a rollover freeze is accompanied by a government de-
fault. This induces banks to refrain from implementing the optimal allocation
and the D&D allocation is implemented instead. In this case, the public pro-
vision of liquidity cannot help to overcome the coordination problem. The
fragility of an economy in which both the solvency of banks and that of the
government are endogenous and interdependent is discussed in more detail in
Chapter 2.
1.6 Liquidity Regulation in Basel III
Our model shows that the government should use its unique ability to en-
sure efficient liquidity management by issuing government securities that are
held by financial intermediaries. This becomes necessary because the efficient
liquidity management relies on the provision of non-contractable liquidity by
private agents. By issuing government bonds, the government can prevent
private agents from coordinating on an equilibrium in which liquidity supply
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breaks down. This is a simple way to stabilize the financial sector and, at
the same time, to circumvent the undesired consequences that might arise if
the regulator directly insured bank liabilities or provided emergency liquidity
in case of a financial crisis. In our model, financial intermediaries voluntar-
ily hold government bonds to manage liquidity. However, in a richer model,
banks may prefer to hold privately produced assets if these assets promise
a higher return than government securities. In this case, a regulator might
optimally force banks to hold government securities in order to enhance stable
liquidity provision.
In the following, we relate our findings to the regulatory treatment of liq-
uidity risk in the context of prudential supervision. Our model can shed light
on the economic consequences of some recently proposed regulation. The
Third Basel Accord (Basel III) introduces a new assessment and regulation
of liquidity risk by defining two minimum standards of funding liquidity (see
Basel Committee, 2010). The two central measures are the Liquidity Cov-
erage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). The LCR
requirement aims to ensure that a bank can withstand a “significantly severe
liquidity stress scenario” with a horizon of 30 days. It requires a bank to have
a sufficient stock of liquid assets in order to cover its liquidity needs during
the next month. The objective of the NSFR requirement is to ensure stable
funding over a one-year horizon. It requires a bank to have a sufficient amount
of equity, long-term debt, and other “stable” funding to finance its stock of
illiquid assets during the next year.
We acknowledge that both measures can in principle be useful tools to
reduce the fragility arising from maturity transformation. Both the LCR
and NSFR address the fundamental problem of maturity mismatch, resulting
from short-term liabilities and long-term illiquid assets. In the light of our
model, however, the regulatory details are not strict enough, as the inherent
fragility of privately produced liquidity is not adequately addressed. Banks
face two types of self-fulfilling liquidity problems: On the asset side, seemingly
liquid, privately produced assets might turn illiquid.21 On the liability side,
seemingly stable wholesale and deposit funding might evaporate in a similar
fashion. In particular, the ability to borrow against privately produced assets
is limited. As our model showed, government bonds play a unique role as
they can eliminate an equilibrium in which private agents coordinate on not
supplying liquidity. We argue that the LCR and NSFR underestimate the
risk of such adverse equilibria and do not sufficiently distinguish between
21Chapter 2 provides a more detailed explanation of why private information and limited
arbitrage capital can cause liquidity problems in markets for privately produced assets.
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private and public assets. After studying the two measures separately, we
will illustrate their similarity and their common problems.
1.6.1 Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)
Basel III requires the LCR, defined as the ratio of High Quality Liquid Assets
(HQLA) and the (hypothetical) total net cash outflows over the next 30 cal-
endar days, to be above 1.22 Thus, the LCR sets a lower bound for the stock
of liquid assets, conditional on a bank’s (expected) cash flows. “Total net cash
outflow” is defined as the maximum of “total expected net cash outflow” and
“25% of total expected cash outflow”. In this context, “expected” denotes
a scenario of a combined idiosyncratic and market-wide shock that entails
(among others) a partial run-off of retail deposits and a partial reduction in
unsecured wholesale funding and secured short-term financing.
The definition of HQLA is such that privately produced assets can partly
be used to satisfy the LCR requirement. HQLA can be divided into two
categories: Level 1 assets are cash, central bank reserves, and government
bonds with 0% risk-weight. Level 2 assets can again be divided in two sub-
categories, Level 2A and Level 2B assets. A minimum haircut of 15% has to
be applied to all Level 2 assets, which is supposed to capture their devaluation
in a crisis scenario. After applying this haircut, Level 2 assets must not make
up more than 40% of the whole stock of HQLA. Level 2A assets include
government bonds with risk weights below 20% as well as corporate debt
securities (including commercial papers) and covered bonds with a rating
of at least AA-. Level 2B assets also include Residential Mortgage Backed
Securities (RMBS) with ratings of at least AA, corporate debt securities with
ratings of at least BBB-, and common equity shares which are constituent of
a major stock index. These assets are subject to a haircut between 25% and
50% and must not make up more than 15% of the stock of HQLA.23
In addition to these requirements, the Basel Committee specifies liquidity
requirements of eligible assets in the following way: Level 2 assets must be
“traded in large, deep and active repo or cash markets charac-
terised by a low level of concentration [and] have a proven record
as a reliable source of liquidity in the markets (repo or sale) even
during stressed market conditions (ie maximum decline of price not
exceeding 10% or increase in haircut not exceeding 10 percentage
22For details on the LCR, see Basel Committee (2013).
23Note that they must also be included of the 40% cap of all Level 2 assets.
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points over a 30-day period during a relevant period of significant
liquidity stress).”24
The requirements for Level 2 assets are thus defined in terms of their past
and present liquidity. The underlying notion seems to be that an asset’s past
and present liquidity predicts its future liquidity. This is particularly evident
in the condition that an asset’s value must have been stable in a “period of
significant liquidity stress”. However, even if an asset stayed liquid during a
past period of liquidity stress, this does not guarantee its future liquidity.
Under the currently proposed regulation, Level 2 assets can constitute up to
40% of the required assets to ensure short-term liquidity. This portfolio may
consist exclusively of claims on the private sector, like corporate loans, MBS,
and ABS. A stress scenario like the one in our model shows that such assets
are not well suited to ensure the liquidity of banks. If banks rely too much
on private assets, the economy might experience a run equilibrium in which
private agents coordinate on a liquidity freeze. The price of seemingly safe and
liquid claims on private institutions might drop substantially and in a fashion
that is not predictable by their prior performance. Such an equilibrium can
be ruled out if banks hold a sufficient stock of government bonds to cover the
collapse of short-term funding. In order to ensure the stable supply of non-
contractable liquidity, only Level 1 assets should be allowed to for liquidity
management.
1.6.2 Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)
As a second measure of liquidity regulation, Basel III requires the NSFR to be
above 1. The NSFR is defined as the ratio of available stable funding (AFS)
and required stable funding (RSF), both with a horizon of one year.25 Thus,
the NSFR sets a lower bound for the amount of stable funding, conditional
on a bank’s portfolio of illiquid assets and off-balance sheet exposures. ASF
comprises capital, preferred stock, and liabilities with maturities of at least
one year, but also deposits and wholesale funding with short or no maturity
that are “expected to stay with the institution for an extended period in
an idiosyncratic stress event.” Liabilities of the latter categories have to be
multiplied by an ASF factor of less than one. ASF aims to exclude unstable
short-term funding, i.e., funding that might quickly be withdrawn or not rolled
over. It excludes short-term wholesale funding, such as interbank lending, but
24Basel Committee (2013).
25For details on the NSFR, see Basel Committee (2010).
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includes customer deposits, because deposit insurance is supposed to make
this funding appear stable.
RSF is a measure of a bank’s illiquid asset portfolio. It is defined as the
sum of the value of a bank’s assets, multiplied by a specific RSF factor that
is supposed to capture an asset’s liquidity risk, plus a similarly weighted sum
of the bank’s off-balance sheet activities or potential liquidity exposures. An
asset’s RSF factor is lower the more liquid this asset is. Cash and securities
with a maturity below one year have an RSF factor of 0%; other securities
and corporate bonds with good ratings have low, but positive RSF factors;
other bonds, mortgages and loans have higher RSF factors, and other assets
(particularly encumbered assets) have RSF factors of 100%.
The notion behind the NSFR requirement is that the ASF serves a bank
to finance its illiquid asset contained in the RSF in times of a liquidity crisis.
Those assets not contained in the RSF are liquid and can thus be sold in
order to compensate the “unstable” funding that might disappear in a crisis.
However, the criticism concerning the specification of the LCR applies in
a similar way to the specification of the NSFR, as it does not sufficiently
consider the problem of self-fulfilling liquidity dry-ups. The definition of RSF
excludes several types of (private) assets that might turn illiquid in a crisis
and thus also require stable funding. Moreover, the definition of ASF relies on
a crisis scenario in which short-term funding is partly assumed to be stable.
Our model shows that non-contractable short-term funding by private agents
is needed for efficient intermediation, but these agents can coordinate on a
liquidity dry-up. While insured demand-deposits could be considered as stable
funding, this does not apply to wholesale funding because investors could
coordinate on a freeze of if banks do not hold a sufficient stock of government
bonds.
1.6.3 Comparison
Although the definitions of the LCR and NSFR appear quite different on first
sight, their time horizon is the only distinct difference. To illustrate this point,
let us consider a stylized bank balance sheet. Assume that the bank’s assets
can be divided into a portfolio of liquid and a portfolio of illiquid assets, and
that the liability side consists of short-term debt, long-term debt, and equity,
see Figure 1.4.
For a moment, let us ignore the different time horizons of the two liquidity
requirements and pretend that all quantities have been defined for the same
horizon. In this case, the left side of the balance sheet consists of HQLA
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Assets Liabilities
Liquid Assets
Illiquid Assets
Short-term Debt
Long-term Debt
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RSF
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Figure 1.4: Schematic representation of the bank balance sheet under the assump-
tion that LCR and NSFR have been defined for the same time horizon.
and RSF, because the illiquid assets are exactly those that require stable
funding. Which asset is considered to be liquid or illiquid is determined by
the scenario of stress that is specified by the regulator. On the liability side,
the scenario specifies which kind of funding is expected to disappear and
which is expected to stay during a crisis. The expected net cash outflow
is defined by the difference between the inflow and outflow of short-term
debt in the specified scenario; it thus measures the expected change in the
bank’s short-term liabilities. The part of short-term funding which (in the
relevant scenario) is not assumed to disappear, together with long-term debt
and equity, forms the ASF. Because total liabilities are necessarily equal to
total assets, the LCR and the NSFR requirements are equivalent: HQLA
exceed expected net cash outflow if and only if ASF exceeds RSF. It follows
that the two measures only vary in their time horizon.
The two main criticisms thus apply similarly to both liquidity measures:
First, the definition of HQLA is too broad, and the definition of RSF is too
restrictive. Second, the definition of the stress scenario appears quite ad-hoc
and underestimates the severity of self-fulfilling liquidity crises. These two
aspects are strongly interconnected: In our model, we showed that banks
optimally rely on the future provision of liquidity, but since this is not con-
tractible initially, investors might coordinate on not providing this liquidity.
Such adverse equilibria can only be ruled out if the bank’s balance sheet is
structured such that disappearance of non-contractible funding can be com-
pensated by selling liquid assets. We postulate that banks should cover this
unstable funding by holding a sufficient stock of government bonds, and that
the government should issue a sufficient amount of bonds for this purpose.
In our model, banks optimally expand their balance sheet by holding gov-
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ernment bonds, and taking on liabilities with the same maturity towards the
government. This increases the ASF as well as the stock of HQLA. Using
the notion of Brunnermeier et al. (2013), this eliminates the banks’ the liq-
uidity mismatch. We argue that holding government bonds is the only way
of eliminating the liquidity mismatch which is compatible with efficient liq-
uidity provision. Because private assets are subject to self-fulfilling liquidity
dry-ups, private assets cannot eliminate the liquidity mismatch.
The 2007-09 financial crisis painfully revealed the fragility associated with
private liquidity production. Neither the regulator nor market participants
suspected that the ABCP market or the repo market, which were both backed
by collateral such as ABS, could turn illiquid. As a consequence, the fund-
ing of institutions that were exposed to subprime mortgage risk broke down
completely, until public liquidity support was provided. The same applied
to institutions that held these assets off-balance sheet, but granted liquidity
guarantees to their off-balance sheet vehicles.
However, it would be wrong to conclude that the regulator only needs to
tighten the regulation on those assets that turned out to be problematic in
the recent crisis. Any privately produced asset might turn illiquid, and any
privately supplied liquidity may evaporate. Whenever liquidity management
relies on the provision of non-contractible resources in future, liquidity regu-
lation should be restrictive.
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter has two main results: First, liquidity management with privately
produced assets is either inefficient or associated with rollover risk, which
makes an economy inherently fragile. Second, financial intermediaries can
implement the optimal allocation by using government bonds.
In the absence of public liquidity, financial intermediaries face a trade-off
between high investment, which goes along with high rollover risk (high level
of illiquid, but profitable long-term investments and low level of storage), and
low investment, which comes with low rollover risk (low levels of profitable
long-term investments and high level of storage). For the case of the 2007-09
financial crisis, our model suggests that intermediaries chose high investment
levels that created a strong maturity mismatch. In the run-up to the crisis,
financial intermediaries transformed long-term real investments into short-
term securities, thereby aiming at making them liquid. E.g., illiquid assets
like ABS and MBS (which are securitized long-term real investments) were
transformed into short-term securities such as ABCP. In the crisis, however,
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these short-term securities stopped being liquid and adverse consequences of
the large-scale maturity mismatch realized.
Importantly, the rollover risk in our model is different from the traditional
bank run problem in the style of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). In D&D,
the bank run problem can be addressed by contracting in the initial period,
e.g., by implementing a deposit insurance or allowing for a suspension of
convertibility. In contrast, the rollover risk in our model cannot be eliminated
in such a way because this would require contracting with a party that is not
available initially. The problem originates from the friction that investors
cannot commit initially to provide liquidity later. Their endowment does not
realize before the time at which financial intermediaries need liquid funds.
This makes liquidity management with privately produced assets inherently
fragile.
In the second part, we demonstrate how liquidity management with govern-
ment securities can improve the efficiency and stability of an economy. The
government has the unique ability to commit future resources via taxation.
Therefore, government securities are – in comparison to privately produced
assets – less prone to coordination failures, i.e., less exposed to rollover risk.
This property makes public outside liquidity superior to private outside liq-
uidity.
This chapter thereby also contributes to the following basic but yet unre-
solved question: How should a public authority deal with liquidity provision?
The traditional view since Bagehot (1873) is that a government should lend to
illiquid but solvent institutions at high rates, while refusing to lend to insol-
vent institutions. The implementation of this principle might not be straight
forward. That is, it may generally be problematic to identify whether an in-
stitution is illiquid or insolvent (see, e.g., Rochet and Vives, 2004). Moreover,
Farhi and Tirole (2012) point out that if a government commits to intervening
in case of liquidity needs, a collective moral hazard may give rise to an overall
excessive maturity mismatch in an economy.
This chapter discusses a different approach to this problem. We find that
the government should ensure efficient liquidity management by issuing gov-
ernment securities that should be held by financial intermediaries. This is a
simple way of circumventing the undesired consequences that may arise when
the regulator insures bank liabilities or provides emergency liquidity in case
of a financial crisis. In our model, financial intermediaries are in fact always
willing to hold government bonds to manage liquidity. However, in a richer
model, banks may prefer to hold privately produced assets if these assets
promise a higher return than government securities. In this case, a regulator
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might optimally force banks to hold government securities in order to enhance
stable liquidity provision.
We thereby reach out to the political debate about which types of assets
should be allowed for liquidity management from a regulatory perspective.
Basel III introduces the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable
Funding Ratio (NSFR) as a measures and requirements to ensure a bank’s
short-term and medium-term liquidity in a stress scenario. However, banks
can partly use assets originated by the private sector in order to satisfy this
requirement. We argue that this may be a severe source of systemic risk: once
liquidity evaporates from the financial sector, these types of assets may cease
to be liquid as well. Therefore, these assets might not be helpful to cover
short-term liabilities and thus to prevent self-fulfilling crises.
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Appendix 1.A Sub-Optimality of Financial
Markets under Outside
Liquidity
Let us analyze the competitive equilibrium of an economy where consumers
hold assets directly and trade on financial markets. In the D&D model, the
first-best cannot be achieved via financial markets because, in equilibrium, the
competitive market prices give consumers investment incentives that do not
induce the investment profile that optimally trades off early liquidity needs
and the returns of the long asset. This inefficiency arises because consumers
do not take into account the pecuniary externalities of their investment. This
is induced by the friction of unobservable liquidity needs (unobservable types).
In our setup, pecuniary externality do not necessarily arise. The mere
unobservability of the liquidity type itself does not impede the implementation
of the first-best. In the absence of return risk, each consumer could privately
invest his whole endowment in the long asset and sell claims on the asset in
the interim period. The key frictions in our case are that, on the one hand,
the return risk cannot be diversified on the individual level and, on the other
hand, the unobservability of the risky return induces adverse selection, leading
to inefficient liquidation. The liquidity type friction only intensifies the return
risk friction.
The first-best can only be implemented if all resources are initially invested
in the long asset. Furthermore, consumers must be perfectly insured against
return risk. However, this insurance is only implementable with commitment
in period zero. In a pure financial market economy with spot markets for
claims on future returns, contingent contracts are not feasible. Therefore, the
financial markets cannot implement an allocation that is efficient ex-ante. The
non-diversifiable idiosyncratic return risk might also imply that consumers
invest a positive fraction of their endowment in storage.
Moreover, the financial-market allocation might not even be efficient ex
post, i.e., given the initial private investment. If all consumers in fact invest
in the long asset privately, all impatient consumers have to either sell or
liquidate their asset in the interim period. Since the return is unobservable,
all assets have to be sold at the same price R∗. All impatient consumers with
a return Ri > R∗/` have an incentive to liquidate instead of selling claims,
reducing the average quality in the market. The liquidation of projects is a
form of adverse selection and constitutes an inefficiency ex post. Moreover,
patient consumers with a return Ri < R∗ have an incentive to sell at price R∗
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instead of waiting, thus exacerbating the adverse selection and inefficiency.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Consumers Consumers Consumers
e0
Investors
di e0R
∗
Investors
di e0Ri
Figure 1.5: Financial Market. The graph illustrates investment and trade under the
assumption that full investment in the long asset is chosen. In the interim period,
the graph denotes the flow of goods and claims for a consumer who chooses to sell
claims on the market. Notice that there are also agents who liquidate their assets or
hold on to them until t = 2 and thus do not interact with investors.
Appendix 1.B Sunspots: Optimal
Contracts under Private
Outside Liquidity
Assume that there is a public signal in t = 1 which we might call sunspot,
following a Bernoulli distribution with success probability p. Assume further
that investors play a pure strategy by which they base their rollover decision
on this public signal. With probability p, all investors refrain from rolling
over, and with probability 1− p, all investors engage in rollover. We are now
looking for the optimal consumption profiles of consumers, i.e., the optimal
investment behavior of banks, and abstract from bank runs. The optimal con-
tract between banks and consumers will be state-contingent, i.e., contingent
on the sunspot, or equivalently, on the behavior of investors.
Define the investment threshold I` such that
`u′
(
e0 − I`
pi
)
= u′
(
RI`
1− pi
)
. (1.11)
This threshold has the following interpretation: It is ex-post optimal to liq-
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uidate a positive fraction in case of a rollover freeze if and only if investment
exceeds this threshold, I > I`. Because ` < 1/R, it holds that I` ∈ (IDD, e0),
i.e., liquidation is not efficient ex post in a setup without outside liquidity
(D&D), but it is efficient if banks do not invest in storage and completely rely
on rollover, but this investors coordinate on a rollover freeze.
For the contingency of rollover, the optimal contract includes perfect con-
sumption smoothing through outside liquidity and no liquidation, c1 = c2 =
e0− I +RI. For the contingency of a rollover freeze, there is positive liquida-
tion if I > I`, and there is no liquidation if I ≤ I`. The optimal investment
level I is determined by the probability of the rollover freeze.
We first derive the optimal consumption allocation in case of a rollover
freeze for a given investment level I. The optimization problem is given by
max
c1,c2,z∈[0,1]
piu(c1) + (1− pi)u(c2), (1.12)
s.t. pic1 ≤ e0 − I + z`RI, and (1.13)
pic1 + (1− pi)c2 ≤ e0 − I + z`RI + (1− z)RI. (1.14)
The aggregate budget constraint (1.14) is always binding. There exists a
threshold I0 < IDD such that for I < I0 it holds that z = 0 and the bud-
get constraint for period one is not binding, leading to perfect consumption
smoothing. For I0 ≤ I ≤ I` it holds that z = 0, and the first period bud-
get constraint is binding, implying that c2 > c1. For I > I` it holds that
z(I) ∈ (0, 1) such that
`u′
(
e0 − I + z`RI
pi
)
= u′
((1− z)RI
1− pi
)
. (1.15)
We now have (implicitly) specified the optimal contingent consumption pro-
files given an investment level I. We now maximize over this investment level.
We split the problem by looking at the maximizing level of investment within
each of the two intervals [I0, I`] and (I`, e0]. We can ignore the interval [0, I0)
because it is dominated by I0.
There exist two thresholds p0 and p`, 0 < p0 < p` < 1, such that I(p) = e0
iff p ≤ p0, and I∗(p`) = I`.
If p ∈ (p0, p`), the optimal I∗(p) ∈ (I`, e0), and I∗ and z are determined by
0 = p
[
(z`R− 1)u′
(
e0 − I∗ + z`RI
pi
)
+ (1− z)Ru′
((1− z)RI∗
1− pi
)]
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+ (1− p)(R− 1)u′(e0 + (R− 1)I∗), and (1.16)
`u′
(
e0 − I + z`RI
pi
)
= u′
((1− z)RI
1− pi
)
. (1.17)
If p > p`, the optimal I∗(p) ∈ [IDD, I`) and its level is determined by
p
[
−u′
(
e0 − I∗
pi
)
+Ru′
(
RI∗
1− pi
)]
+(1−p)(R−1)u′(1+(R−1)I∗) = 0. (1.18)
For any p ∈ (p`, 1), it holds that I∗(p) ∈ (IDD, I`). As p → 1, it holds that
I∗(p)→ IDD.
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Sovereign Defaults, Bank Runs,
and Contagion
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we provide a model that unifies the notion of self-fulfilling
banking crises and sovereign debt crises. We show how these crises can be
contagious, i.e., how a bank run can trigger a sovereign default, and vice versa
(first type of contagion). We discuss under which conditions a government
is unable to eliminate self-fulfilling banking crises by implementing a deposit
insurance scheme. Moreover, we illustrate how crises can be contagious across
countries (second type of contagion), and how contagious crises can be pre-
vented. This allows us to evaluate the efficacy of recent policy proposals
for the implementation of banking union in the euro area. We show under
which conditions a supranational Deposit Guarantee Scheme can eliminate
self-fulfilling crises at not cost.
The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area which has accompanied and fol-
lowed the recent financial crisis since early 2009 has made the interdependence
of sovereign and financial stability a prominent topic in the academic and po-
litical debate. Farhi and Tirole (2014) state that danger of the feedback loop
between banking crises and sovereign debt crises is an exceptionally uncontro-
versial economic idea. Several terrifying terms have been invented invented to
describe this phenomenon, like “vicious cycle”, “doom loop”, “diabolic loop”,
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or “deadly embrace”.
However, this phenomenon is anything but new. Historically, sovereign de-
faults and banking crises have often preceded and accompanied each other
(see, e.g., Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, 2011), but most existing data concerns
emerging economies. Furthermore, there have been surprisingly few formal
models that help to guide our theoretical understanding of how sovereign
defaults and banking crises are interrelated, in particular for the case of de-
veloped and highly leveraged economies. Only recent, theoretical models on
this topic were provided, e.g., by Acharya et al. (2014), Farhi and Tirole
(2014), Leonello (2013), Cooper and Nikolov (2013), and König et al. (2013).
Banking crises and sovereign debt crises have the common feature that
they may result from coordination on a bad equilibrium. In a self-fulfilling
bank run, depositors desire to withdraw all at once. This is an equilibrium
because if all depositors desire to withdraw at once, it forces an otherwise
solvent bank to engage in inefficient liquidation, leading to insolvency (see,
e.g., Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005). In a self-
fulfilling sovereign debt crisis, investors roll over a sovereign’s debt only at a
high risk premium, or even refuse to do so. This constitutes an equilibrium as
the high sovereign risk premium increases the government’s debt burden and
thereby the likelihood of a default (see, e.g., Calvo, 1988; Cole and Kehoe,
2000).
We present a simple banking model of maturity transformation in the tradi-
tion of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). In the first part of this chapter, we con-
sider the case of a closed economy. The model is reduced to a two-period ver-
sion (we do not model the investment stage) and features consumers, banks,
investors, and a government. We make two key assumptions: First, banks
hold government bonds that they can sell in a secondary market in order to
manage the liquidity needs of consumers. Second, the government’s tax base
is correlated with the real economic activity which in turn depends on the
performance of the financial sector. The model features a strategic comple-
mentarity within the consumers’ withdrawal decision, within the investors’
decision to purchase government bonds, as well as across the decisions of the
two types of agents. There exist two types of self-fulfilling equilibria in our
model: The first one is a no-crisis equilibrium, in which government bonds
trade at face value, and the government as well as the banks fulfill their obli-
gations. The second one is a crisis equilibrium. In the crisis equilibrium,
all consumers withdraw early, causing a bank run. Depending on the fiscal
soundness of the government, a bank run can be accompanied by a rollover
freeze and a sovereign default. If the government is fiscally weak, a banking
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crisis and a sovereign default aggravate and reinforce each other in a “vicious
circle”. Only if a government is fiscally strong, it can eliminate the crisis
equilibrium by providing a deposit insurance.
In the second part of this chapter, we extend our model to a multiple coun-
try setup where countries are interdependent, and we analyze cross-country
effects of banking crises and sovereign debt crises. We assume that countries
are interdependent due to banks diversifying their government bond holdings.
If countries are sufficiently interdependent, self-fulfilling twin crises are con-
tagious across borders. We show that if one country is fiscally weak while the
other country is fiscally sound, it may be beneficial for both countries to pool
their funds. The crisis equilibrium and its adverse consequences can be ruled
out ex-ante by the following policy: Both countries form a banking union that
implements a supranational deposit insurance scheme, and potentially also a
fiscal union. By committing to repay the sovereign debt and to provide de-
posit insurance jointly, their joint promise will never be tested in equilibrium
and is thus costless. A crucial insight is that forming such a union is not only
beneficial for the fiscally weak country, but also for the fiscally strong country.
Guided by the insights of the model, we discuss two policy implications.
The first policy implication concerns the design of the European Banking
Union, with a special focus on the deposit insurance. Our model features
cross-border costs of banking crises and sovereign defaults and points out
channels through which a crisis in one country can trigger a crisis in another
country. This in turn allows rationalizing policy responses by countries that
are affected by foreign banking crises or sovereign defaults. The model al-
lows us to give conditions under which a banking union (i.e., a joint deposit
insurance) or the combination of a banking and a fiscal union can prevent
contagious self-fulfilling banking crises and sovereign defaults. The model
hence sheds light on the policy debates following the European debt crisis
and allows us to investigate the efficacy of recent policy proposals (European
Commission, 2013a). These proposals for a banking union focus on the Single
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM).
A supranational Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS) which would take the cur-
rent national deposit insurance to a supranational level seems to be politically
infeasible so far. By considering the self-fulfilling nature of banking crises, we
show to what extend a banking union in its current form is ineffective at pre-
venting such crises. Given that there are differences in the fiscal soundness of
its member states, we argue that a banking union might only be effective if
it comes with a joint deposit insurance.
The second policy implication concerns the regulatory treatment of banks
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holding government bonds. While there may be good reasons for banks to use
government bonds as an instrument to manage liquidity needs,1 we show that
this may also be a considerable source of fragility once there is a prospect of a
government default. Fragility arises in our setup whenever the government’s
ability to repay its debt depends on the performance of the financial sec-
tor. This condition may be satisfied in developed economies that have highly
leveraged financial systems. This chapter can therefore also be understood
as a contribution to the debate concerning the liquidity regulation of banks.
Regulatory frameworks typically facilitate the holding of government debt by
intermediaries. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision initially re-
frained from imposing any capital requirement for government bond holdings
(see, e.g., Goodhart, 2011). Positive risk weights for poorly rated government
bonds have been put on the agenda only recently, and were introduced in
Basel III (Basel Committee, 2011). Our model provides an argument for why
the exposure of banks to sovereign debt is a severe problem that is not ad-
equately dealt with under both the current and the currently planned bank
regulation.
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 presents a model of a
closed economy, derives the equilibria, and discusses the effect of a deposit
insurance. In Section 2.3, the model is extended to a two-country setting
with international integration. We analyze contagion across countries and
discuss optimal crisis prevention policies. Section 2.4 relates our findings to
the current debate about the European Banking Union.
Related Literature
This chapter reaches out to the large literature on self-fulfilling banking crises
(see, e.g., Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Rochet and Vives, 2004; Goldstein
and Pauzner, 2005) and self-fulfilling sovereign debt crises (see, e.g., Calvo,
1988; Alesina et al., 1990; Cole and Kehoe, 2000), and attempts to unify some
aspects of the two strands.
The first part of this chapter is very closely related to a series of recent
papers that model banking crises and sovereign debt crises in unified frame-
works (Cooper and Nikolov, 2013; König et al., 2013; Leonello, 2013). Cooper
and Nikolov also provide a model with multiple equilibria where the adverse
equilibrium is characterized by a vicious cycle in which a government debt
crisis and a banking crisis aggravate and reinforce each other. However, their
focus is on the pricing of government debt, while emphasize the strategic
complementarity of agents. The papers by König et al. and Leonello provide
1See, e.g., Holmström and Tirole, 1998, Gorton and Ordoñez, 2013, and Chapter 1.
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models featuring unique equilibria – reminiscent of Goldstein’ (2005) twin
crisis model – and they analyze how government guarantees affect financial
stability and the government’s ability to fulfill its obligation. All three pa-
pers have in common that the contagion from a banking crisis to a sovereign
default originates from the increased public liabilities that arise from a safety
net. In contrast, contagion in our setup arises because a financial crisis re-
duces the government’s tax base and thus decreases its funding instead of
increasing its expenditure. The channel from sovereign debt to banking crisis
is similar, however, it results from banks hold government bonds.
With Acharya et al. (2014), we share the notion that the government’s tax
base is limited by a Laffer-curve property. Unlike our approach, they focus
on the optimal redistribution (bailout) between a financial sector with debt
overhang and a corporate sector. They find that a bailout can lose its bite if
it lowers the value of government bonds that are held by the financial sector.
In the second part of this chapter, we analyze how crises can be contagious
across countries. This part is related to the literature on financial contagion
and the spreading of banking panics (see, e.g., Allen and Gale, 2000; Das-
gupta, 2004). In particular, the second part of this chapter relates to Bolton
and Jeanne (2011) who analyze the cross-border effects of sovereign defaults
in financially integrated areas. In their model, government debt is used as
collateral in interbank markets. Economic integration is beneficial as banks
can diversify their government bond holdings, which fosters welfare-increasing
interbank trade. However, this comes with possible contagion of a sovereign
default ex-post, and fiscally strong countries might suffer from fiscal integra-
tion. This chapter is concerned with maturity transformation by banks and
its inherent fragility, and not with the banks’ role in allocating capital. More-
over, government defaults are endogenous in our setup and directly linked to
the performance of the banking sector. In contrast to the results of Bolton
and Jeanne, we find that fiscally strong countries might actually benefit from
fiscal integration if this prevents self-fulfilling crises.
Farhi and Tirole (2014) consider a model featuring fundamental financial
and fiscal shocks in which banks hold domestic and foreign government bonds.
Banks have an incentive to engage in excessive risk taking, particularly in
collective moral hazard because the national government cannot commit to
refrain from bailouts. This provides a new argument in favor of a bank-
ing union because the government is better off by delegating regulation to a
supranational supervisor who takes a tough ex-post regulatory stance.
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2.2 Single-Country Model
2.2.1 Setup
Consider an economy that goes through a sequence of two dates, t ∈ {1, 2}.
The economy is populated by a continuum of consumers of mass one and a
continuum of investors of mass one. Moreover, there is a banking sector and a
government. There exists a single good that can be used for both consumption
and investment, and all units are denoted in terms of this good.
Consumers
Each consumer i is endowed with a demand deposit contract (c∗1, c∗2) that al-
lows her either to withdraw c∗1 units from her bank account in t = 1 or c∗2 units
in t = 2. Consumers have preferences as proposed by Diamond and Dybvig
(1983). There are two types: a fraction pi ∈ [0, 1] of consumers is impatient,
while the remaining fraction (1 − pi) is patient. Impatient consumers only
derive utility from consuming early; their utility is given by u(c1). Patient
consumers are indifferent between consuming early and late; their utility is
given by u(c1 + c2). Types are private information of each consumer. Con-
sumers face the decision to withdraw and to consume in t = 1 or to withdraw
and consume in t = 2. Notice that the attributes “patient / impatient” char-
acterize the consumer’s exogenous types. In contrast, the attributes “late /
early” will characterize the endogenous decision of consumers: an “early con-
sumer” withdraws and consumes in t = 1, while a “late consumer” withdraws
and consumes in t = 2. We denote the decision of each consumer i to with-
draw as well as to consume early with ωi ∈ {0, 1}, where ωi takes the value
one if consumer i withdraws in t = 1. Let ω = ∫ 10 ωidi be the aggregate mass
of early consumers.
Banking Sector
There is a banking sector that has the demand deposit contracts – which are
the assets of consumers – as liabilities. It owns two types of assets: it holds
government bonds as well as an illiquid portfolio of loans, both maturing at
t = 2.
Banks are assumed to hold government bonds for the purpose of liquidity
management. While we are not giving a micro-foundation for why banks are
holding government bonds, we refer to various arguments for why financial
intermediaries use government securities for liquidity management.
Government bonds are valuable as a medium of transfer across time (see,
e.g., Gale, 1990; Woodford, 1990), and private agents may not be able to pro-
vide sufficient pledgable income (Holmström and Tirole, 1998). Furthermore,
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government securities – unlike private assets – are not subject to adverse se-
lection (Gorton and Ordoñez, 2013), and government securities are simply less
exposed to rollover risk than privately produced assets (compare Chapter 1).
In our model, banks are not considered to be agents. They behave mechan-
ically in that they serve early-withdrawing consumers by selling government
bonds to investors and by liquidating the illiquid assets if necessary. Having
the demand deposit contracts as liabilities, banks need to serve a mass ω of
consumers with c∗1 units in t = 1 each, and a mass 1 − ω of consumers with
c∗2 units in t = 2. Banks own a stock of government bonds which mature in
t = 2. Bonds are liquid in the sense that they may be sold to investors in
t = 1. Selling these government bonds allow banks to fulfill their short-term
liability, i.e., to serve early consumers. The total amount of government debt
in the economy is given by B, and banks own a fraction α of them, i.e., they
own αB < B units of government bonds. One unit of the government bond
is a promise of the government to repay one unit of the good in t = 2. Details
of the government bonds will be further specified below.
Moreover, banks also own I units of an illiquid asset to serve their long-term
liabilities. The illiquid asset has an after-tax return of r = (1 − τ)R > 1 in
period two. The asset can be liquidated in t = 1, yielding a return per unit of
` < 1. The fraction of illiquid assets which banks liquidate is denoted by z.
The total return of liquidation is thus given by z`I. As indicated, the illiquid
asset can be interpreted as a loan portfolio which pays off in the long run. In
the short run, it can be liquidated at a substantial discount. The liquidation
value ` can be interpreted as the price in the secondary market for the bank’s
loan portfolios and the discount may result from various frictions we do not
model.2
Government
There is a government that has an outstanding amount of debt B, maturing
in t = 2. Like banks, the government is assumed to behave mechanically.
The government always repays its debt if possible and defaults otherwise. In
t = 2, the government has an overall tax revenue of T (z) = E + τ(1 − z)RI
at its disposal. It consists of an exogenous tax revenue of E ≥ 0, and an
endogenous tax revenue τ(1 − z)RI from taxation of the illiquid technology
of the banking sector, where τ ∈ (0, 1) is fixed. The tax revenue is used for
2The assumption of low liquidation values is standard in the banking literature and may
result from moral hazard (Holmström and Tirole, 1997), limited commitment of future
cash-flows (Hart and Moore, 1994), adverse selection (Flannery, 1996), or uncertainty-
averse investors (Uhlig, 2010).
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the repayment of the government’s debt.3
We interpret the exogenous tax revenue E as the tax revenue that the
government generates irrespective of the performance of the banking sector.
In turn, the endogenous tax revenue displays the fiscal revenue that depends
on the performance of the banking sector and thus decreases in the level of
liquidation z. It should thus be interpreted as the taxable economic activity
that is generated through successful intermediation by banks. We assume
that the government cannot raise any taxes in t = 1. This clearly displays an
extreme simplification. However, we argue that a government’s ability to raise
taxes at any point in time has natural limits,4 and we make the simplifying
assumption that it is zero in the short run.
Importantly, we assume that the government repays its debt whenever
B ≤ T (z). For simplicity we assume that it fully defaults otherwise. With
this assumption, we deviate from large parts of the sovereign risk literature
and completely abstract from willingness to pay considerations.5 However,
we refer to recent contributions arguing that ability-to-pay constraints domi-
nate willingness-to-pay considerations, especially in advanced economies with
a high degree of leverage where defaults may trigger severe financial sector
turmoil (Gennaioli et al., 2014; Acharya and Rajan, 2013). If the govern-
ment cannot default selectively (Guembel and Sussman, 2009; Broner et al.,
2010), its incentives to default are generally very weak whenever the costs of
defaulting are very high for domestic creditors. Thus, a sovereign default in a
leveraged economy is likely to result from a binding ability to pay constraint.
Investors
There is a continuum of investors of mass 1. Each investor j is equipped
with one unit of the good in t = 1. Investors are risk-neutral and do not
discount. Investors buy government bonds from banks whenever their return
is non-negative. Formally, the decision of an outside investor j to purchase
government bonds from banks at face value or not is denoted ηj ∈ {0, 1}. It
takes the value one if she is willing to buy a government bond at a price of
one. Let η = min[αB, ∫ 10 ηjdj] be the aggregate mass of outside investors that
3The remaining government budget can be used for other purposes. It could be used to
provide a public good, or it could be transferred to the consumers. The exact use of
remaining funds is not relevant in our model.
4See, e.g., the Laffer-curve property in Acharya et al. (2014).
5The literature on sovereign debt and risk has been shaped by the willingness to pay view,
which argues that governments repay their debt when the costs of repayment are lower
than the penalty expected for default. In the literature, default penalties have been
argued to be, e.g., exclusion from capital markets or trade sanctions (see, e.g., Eaton
and Gersovitz, 1981; Bulow and Rogoff, 1989).
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buy government bonds at face value from banks.
In the following, we will refer to the purchase of government bonds by
investors as rollover. Note that, in our setup, it does not matter whether the
government needs to borrow t = 1 in order to repay banks that hold bonds
that mature in t = 1 or whether banks need to sell government bonds that
mature in t = 2 in a secondary market in t = 1. The first scenario clearly
looks like a classical rollover problem. As both scenarios are equivalent, we
use the expression rollover in order to simplify the wording.
Parameters
In the following, we make some restrictions on the model’s parameters in
order to ensure outcomes and effects in a relevant domain. The first three
assumptions guarantee the existence of a no crises equilibrium (also referred
to as type I equilibrium), while the last assumption ensures the existence of
a crisis equilibrium (type II equilibrium).
Assumption 2.1. c∗2 ≥ c∗1
Assumption 2.1 guarantees that it is incentive-compatible for patient con-
sumers to withdraw late and to consume in t = 2 conditional on banks being
able to pay out their promised payment, i.e., conditional on no liquidation.
Assumption 2.2. pic∗1 = αB ≤ 1 and rI = (1− pi)c∗2
The first equation of Assumption 2.2 ensures that banks can serve all impa-
tient consumers by selling their government bond holdings at face value. The
second equation ensures that all patient consumers can be served by the long-
term return of the loan portfolio if they withdraw late. Moreover, αB ≤ 1
implies that investors have enough funds to purchase all government bonds
from banks at face value.
Assumption 2.3. T (0) = E + τRI ≥ B
Assumption 2.3 ensures that the government’s tax revenue is sufficient to
repay the government’s debt given that there is no liquidation by banks.
Assumption 2.4. (1− pi)c∗1 > `I
Assumption 2.4 implies that the banks will be insolvent and illiquid in
t = 1 in case all consumers withdraw early, irrespective of the government’s
solvency. The reason is that liquidation is sufficiently inefficient for a panic-
based bank run to exist. While the patient consumers’ claims might be met
by selling the government bonds, Assumption 2.4 implies that if all patient
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consumers withdraw early, their claims equal to (1 − pi)c∗1 cannot be met
by proceeds of complete liquidation, `I. That is, the banking sector will be
illiquid and insolvent in t = 1 whenever there is complete withdrawal and
liquidation.
2.2.2 Outcomes
In the following section, we show that the economy described above has two
equilibria in pure strategies: a no crisis (type I) equilibrium and a crisis
(type II) equilibrium. In the no-crisis equilibrium, only impatient consumers
withdraw early and outside investors roll over the government’s debt. In
the crisis equilibrium, all consumers withdraw early, causing a bank run.
Depending on the fiscal soundness of the government, a bank run can be
accompanied by a sovereign default and a rollover freeze.
In order to derive the equilibrium outcomes, we first analyze the banks’
liquidation of the loan portfolio for any given level of aggregate withdrawal and
any rollover decision. We can then calculate the value of the demand deposit
contract, as well as the value of government bonds in t = 2, as functions of
aggregate withdrawal and rollover. This in turn will pin down the optimal
individual withdrawal and rollover decisions in t = 1.
Liquidation
Banks have to fulfill their obligations in t = 1 whenever possible. Recall
that ω denotes the mass of consumers that withdraw early, and η the mass
of investors purchasing government bonds at face value. Banks need liquid
funds of ωc∗1 in t = 1, since they have to pay c∗1 units of the good to a mass
ω of consumers. Banks sell η units of the governments bonds to investors.
Given ω and η, banks must liquidate a fraction z such that their liquid funds
equal the demand for early consumption or engage in complete liquidation,
z = 1, otherwise. Liquidation z is implicitly given by the budget equation
ωc∗1 = η + z`I whenever feasible, or explicitly by
z(ω, η) = min
[
1, [ωc
∗
1 − η]+
`I
]
. (2.1)
If banks can serve all withdrawing consumers by selling government bonds,
liquidation is unnecessary. However, if the proceeds from selling government
bonds are not sufficient to serve all withdrawing consumers, banks will have
to engage in inefficient liquidation of the loan portfolio.
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Withdrawal and Rollover
The individual decision of patient consumers to withdraw depends on the
funds that banks have available in t = 2. Similarly, the decision of investors
to purchase government bonds depends on the funds that the government has
available in t = 2. Whenever there is liquidation, the amount left for late
consumers and the tax revenue of the government decrease.
The deposit contract (c∗1, c∗2) is characterized by promised payments. If
there is liquidation, actual repayments (c1, c2) may fall short of the promised
levels. In period one, banks have to serve any withdrawing consumer with c∗1
whenever possible. If banks engage in liquidation, this reduces the level of late
consumption c2, and if consumers in addition start to run on the banks, this
also reduces c1. For impatient consumers, it is dominant strategy to withdraw
early, implying ω ∈ [pi, 1]. Given liquidation z(η, ω), the payments made to
each patient consumer who is withdrawing late is given by
c2(z(ω, η), ω) = (1− z(ω, η))1− pi1− ωc
∗
2. (2.2)
A patient consumer only withdraws early if c2 < c∗1.6 The optimal with-
drawal decision of a patient consumer is therefore given by
ω∗i (ω, η) =
0 if c2(z(ω, η)) ≥ c
∗
1
1 if c2(z(ω, η)) < c∗1.
(2.3)
We can derive the optimal rollover decision in a similar fashion. Given z(η, ω),
the government has a tax revenue of
T (z(ω, η)) = E + τ(1− z(ω, η))RI. (2.4)
The government repays its debt whenever the tax revenue T (z(η, ω)) ex-
ceeds the government’s outstanding debt B, and defaults otherwise. Investors
purchase government debt at face value if the government will be able to re-
pay its debt, and do not purchase if the government is expected to default.
An investor’s rollover decision is thus given by
η∗i (ω, η) =
1 if B ≤ T (z(ω, η))0 if B > T (z(ω, η)). (2.5)
6We define c2(1, 1) := 0, i.e., the potential late consumption is zero in case of complete
liquidation.
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Figure 2.1: Interdependence of Sovereign Debt and Banking.
The interrelation of the model’s key variables is summarized in Figure 2.1.
The left cycle is the well-known cycle that lies at the heart of a self-fulfilling
bank run, as in the classic bank-run model by Diamond and Dybvig (1983):
Increased liquidation lowers the level of funds available for late consumption.
This in turn increases the incentive to withdraw early. High early withdrawal,
however, further increases liquidation.7 The right cycle shows how an antic-
ipated sovereign default can be self-fulfilling: The inability of banks to sell
government bonds forces them to liquidate some of the loan portfolio. Liqui-
dation reduces the tax base and thus future tax revenue. This in turn may
reduce the amount the government can repay. Consequentially, investors may
become unwilling to purchase government bonds, forcing banks to liquidate
even more.
The two cycles are connected through the liquidation of the illiquid loan
portfolio. This allows a banking crisis to be contagious by triggering a
sovereign debt crisis, and vice versa (1st type of contagion).
Definition 2.1. A Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is given by a set of
consumers’ withdrawal decisions {ωi} and outside investors’ rollover decisions
{ηj}, such that these decisions are best responses, i.e., ωi = ω∗i (ω, η) ∀i and
ηj = η∗j (ω, η) ∀j, where ω =
∫ 1
0 ωidi, and η = min[αB,
∫ 1
0 ηjdj].
We are now equipped in order to formulate the first result:
Proposition 2.1. The model has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
7For the sake of completeness, the dotted arrow represents a positive feedback effect of
early withdrawal on late consumption: more consumers withdrawing early implies that
the remaining available funds are distributed among a smaller mass of late consumers.
This channel represents the same effect through which a bank run is welfare-increasing
in Allen and Gale (1998).
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a) Type I equilibrium (ω, η) = (pi, αB):
Only impatient consumers withdraw early, banks do not liquidate, the tax
revenue is sufficient to repay creditors, and investors are willing to buy
government bonds.
b) Type II equilibrium
E < B Sovereign default and bank run (ω, η) = (1, 0): All consumers
withdraw early and there is no rollover, inducing full liquidation.
This results in illiquidity and insolvency of both the government and
the banking sector.
E ≥ B Bank run (ω, η) = (1, αB): Investors roll over government debt,
but all consumers withdraw early. Although there is a bank run and
full liquidation, the government is still able to fully serve its debt.
For the proof of Proposition 2.1, see the Appendix. The multiplicity of
equilibria arises from the strategic complementarity between agents. There
are three different components of strategic complementarity in the model.
First, there is a strategic complementarity between consumers in their deci-
sion to withdraw: the more consumers withdraw, the higher the incentive for
an individual consumer to withdraw as well. Second, there is strategic com-
plementarity between the investors in their decision to purchase government
bonds: more investors purchasing government bonds increases the individual
incentive to purchase government bonds as well. Third, there is strategic
complementarity across the two types of agents: higher levels of withdrawal
decrease the incentive to roll over and vice versa.
Note that in the above setup both types of equilibria always exist. The
type I equilibrium is always characterized by successful debt rollover and the
absence of a panic-based bank run. The type II equilibrium is characterized
by either a twin crisis where a sovereign default and a panic-based bank
run accompany each other, or by a panic-based bank run without sovereign
default. The type II equilibrium is a twin crisis whenever the exogenous tax
base E is less than the government’s outstanding debt B, or if E/B < 1. In
this case, banking crises and sovereign debt crises are contagious in the sense
that they aggravate and reinforce each other. Whenever E exceeds B, i.e.,
E/B ≥ 1 , the government will be able to repay its debt irrespective of the
occurrence of a banking crisis. In this case, a sovereign default will never
occur, but a bank run still constitutes an equilibrium.
The parameter E (or the ratio E/B) can be interpreted as a measure of
the government’s fiscal stability. If E/B ≥ 1, the government can raise taxes
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irrespective of the performance of banks which will suffice to repay the out-
standing debt. The taxable economic activity thus does not depend too much
on the provision of financial services. If E/B < 1, the government’s ability
to tax and to repay is closely linked to the banking sector, i.e., the taxable
economic activity depends strongly on the performance of the banking sector.
Therefore, whenever E/B < 1, the crisis equilibrium is not only characterized
by a banking crisis, but also by a sovereign default.
Generally, E/B < 1 is reminiscent of the crisis zone in Cole and Kehoe
(2000): when the exogenous tax base that is available irrespective of the per-
formance of the banking sector is low, runs become possible. In the following,
we will show that this may be true irrespective of the existence of a deposit
insurance.
2.2.3 Deposit Insurance Scheme (DIS)
We now analyze the effect of a deposit insurance. We define deposit insurance
to be a guarantee by the government that each consumer receives c∗1 units at
a period of his choice. If the deposit insurance is credible, it prevents patient
consumers from withdrawing early because in any contingency consumers get
at least as much in period two as in period one. In the next paragraph, we will
analyze under which conditions a deposit insurance is credible in our setup.
We assume that the government uses its tax revenue to repay its bonds first,
and only uses its remaining funds to fulfill the DIS afterwards if possible.
This ordering might seem odd at first sight because government bonds only
get repaid in period two, but the deposit insurance might already be needed
in period one. However, since the government does not have funds in period
one – recall that we assumed that the short-term tax base is zero – it will
have to borrow in order to provide a DIS. The government will only be able
to borrow and actually fulfill a deposit insurance if its outstanding debt is not
already exceeding its available funds. Therefore, the government bonds are
effectively senior to the deposit insurance.
The deposit insurance is credible if the government is able to repay its
debt and to pay for the deposit insurance in any contingency. The most
adverse contingency is the case in which all consumers withdraw early, and
the banks thus have to engage in full liquidation. A sufficient condition for
the deposit insurance to be credible is that the government can repay its debt
B. Therefore, banks can sell their pic∗1 bonds at face value. The complete
liquidation of the illiquid loan portfolio provides the banks with an additional
amount of `I units. Thus, the deposit insurance has to cover the missing funds
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in order to serve the each consumer with c∗1 units. Therefore, the maximal
amount a deposit insurance might have to cover is given by DI = c∗1−`I−pic∗1.
Whenever E ≥ B + DI, the deposit insurance scheme is credible, because
the government can actually provide this amount in any contingency.
Proposition 2.2. By providing a deposit insurance scheme, the government
can eliminate the crisis equilibrium iff E ≥ B +DI.
The government is able to eliminate the crisis equilibrium whenever its
exogenous tax revenue exceeds the sum of the outstanding debt B and the
maximum cost of a deposit insurance DI. In this case, it can repay its debt
and credibly insure deposits of all consumers. The deposit insurance is never
tested and therefore eliminates the adverse equilibrium at no costs. For B ≤
E < B+DI, there are multiple equilibria. The government cannot prevent a
bank run because the deposit insurance scheme is not credible, but since it can
serve its debt, a rollover freeze does not occur in equilibrium. For E < B, the
government can neither prevent a bank run nor a sovereign default. Figure 2.2
shows which type of equilibria exist for different levels of E under the deposit
insurance scheme.
E0 B
sovereign default & bank run bank run
“no crisis” equilibriumtype I equilibrium
type II equilibrium
B +DI
Figure 2.2: Existence of Equilibria under the Deposit Insurance Scheme. The type I
equilibrium always exist. The type II equilibrium only exists if the deposit insurance
is not credible, i.e., if E < B+DI. It is characterized by a bank run for E ≥ B, and
by a twin crisis for E < B.
Finally, notice that the deposit insurance does not bail out banks; it only
steps in after banks have already defaulted on their liabilities. In fact, it would
be more efficient in our model to bail out banks in order to prevent them from
engaging in inefficient liquidation. However, in terms of preventing the crisis
equilibrium, a bailout mechanism would have exactly the same effects as a
DIS. The government could announce that it would bail out the banks in case
of a crisis and thereby eliminate the crisis equilibrium if the announcement
is credible. For this to be true, the government would need exactly the same
budget, i.e., B +DI.
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2.3 Two-Country Model
We now consider an extended, two-country setting of the model. This allows
us to analyze under which conditions a crisis in one country may be conta-
gious, triggering a crisis in another. We will use the setup to investigate which
policies eliminate the adverse crisis equilibrium and ensure financial stability.
In our model, a country consists of domestic consumers who hold demand de-
posit contracts with domestic banks. Furthermore, there is a government that
taxes domestic economic activity. In our model, investors are not associated
with countries.
Assume that there are two countries that are labeled homeH and foreign F .
Without loss of generality, we take the view of the home country to facilitate
the verbal interpretation of our analysis. Both countries are as described in the
single-country case and identical to each other, except for some international
financial interdependence. Furthermore, we vary the amount of exogenous
tax revenue EH and EF . A country k is called fiscally sound whenever Ek
is very high, and fiscally weak whenever Ek is low. We assume throughout
most of this section that each country implements a deposit insurance scheme
targeting domestic depositors whenever feasible. We analyze a policy setup
where both countries can form a banking union or a fiscal and banking union.
The banking union is a supranational policy tool that implements a joint
deposit insurance for both countries. When tested, the costs are borne by the
two countries jointly. We contrast these policies with a situation of political
autarky where there is no supranational policy. Throughout the analysis, we
maintain Assumptions 2.1 to 2.4 for both countries.
Importantly, we assume that countries are interdependent. We introduce
interdependency by assuming that banks of both countries hold government
bonds of both countries. While we assume this interdependence, we refer
to empirical evidence as well as to theoretical explanations why government
bond holdings are diversified.8
In a nutshell, we will present two main results: First, crises can be conta-
gious across countries once there is interdependence. A sovereign debt crisis
in the foreign country is always costly for the home country, and also triggers
a crisis in the home country if the interdependence is sufficiently strong. Sec-
ond, a fiscal and banking union may eliminate the adverse equilibrium at no
8For empirical evidence, see Bolton and Jeanne (2011) and Cooper and Nikolov (2013),
who describe the cross-country holdings of government bonds in the euro area by using
the European Banking Authority Stress Test data. Moreover, cross-country holdings
of government bonds can result, e.g., from international activities of banks, or from
diversification considerations (see, e.g., Bolton and Jeanne, 2011).
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costs if joint exogenous tax revenue is sufficiently high.
2.3.1 Setup
Assume that banks in both countries still hold a portfolio of government
bonds. However, now this portfolio not only contains bonds of the domestic
country, but also bonds of the other government. In both countries, banks
hold an amount (1 − λ)αB of the domestic and λαB of the non-domestic
government bonds, where λ ∈ (0, 1). The mass of investors who are willing to
buy bonds of the respective government is denoted by ηH and ηF . When buy-
ing government bonds, investors do not discriminate based on the nationality
of banks selling the bonds.
As before, banks in the home country need to serve each early consumer with
c∗1 units in t = 1, potentially forcing them to liquidate a fraction zH(ωH , ηH , ηF )
of its loan portfolio. The budget equation of home banks in t = 1 is therefore
given by
ωHc∗1 = (1− λ)ηH + ληF + zH`I (2.6)
whenever possible. In analogy to the single-country case we can express liq-
uidation as
zH(ωH , ηH , ηF ) = min
[
1, [ω
Hc∗1 − (1− λ)ηH − ληF ]+
`I
]
. (2.7)
Observe that, in contrast to the single country case, home banks’ liquidation is
now not only a function of aggregate withdrawal and aggregate rollover in the
home country, but also a function of aggregate rollover of the foreign country’s
sovereign debt. Late consumption and tax revenue are given as above: they
are functions of the liquidation fraction, cH2 (zH , ωH) and TH(zH). Therefore,
if the foreign country defaults, which goes along a rollover freeze of foreign
debt, the consumption and the tax revenue in the home country decreases
because the countries are interdependent. We focus on a case where there is
a high degree of interdependence between the countries.
Assumption 2.5. λ ≥ c∗2−c∗1c∗2
`I
pic∗1
The assumption implies that interdependence, measured by λ, is so strong
that whenever there is a sovereign default abroad, there also is a bank run at
home – unless home depositors are kept from running by a deposit insurance
scheme. A high λ implies that once the foreign government defaults, losses of
banks at home on the foreign government bonds are also high. Assumption 2.5
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implies a default abroad in fact induces a liquidation that would lower the
late consumption to a level below the promised amount of early consumption,
c2 < c
∗
1, giving patient consumers an incentive to withdraw early. For a formal
analysis, see the proof of Proposition 2.3 in the Appendix.
2.3.2 International Contagion
Let us first assume that countries do not intervene abroad, but only provide
a deposit insurance scheme to domestic depositors. As mentioned above, we
refer to this as a political autarky. We analyze how a sovereign default abroad
(i.e., ηF = 0, possible whenever EF < B) may be contagious and affect
outcomes in the home country. In doing so, we implicitly characterize the
crisis equilibrium of the two-country economy.
Whenever there is a sovereign default abroad, the amount required to make
a deposit insurance at home credible is given by D˜I = DI + λαB. This
amount is larger than in the single-country case. In order to make the de-
posit insurance scheme credible in the two-country case, the home country’s
government has to be able to cover the losses on foreign government bonds in
addition to the cost of the deposit insurance, as specified in the single-country
setup.
Proposition 2.3. In a Nash equilibrium in which there is a sovereign default
in the foreign country, the following outcomes prevail in the home country:
EH < B Sovereign default and bank run (ωH , ηH) =
(1, 0): All consumers withdraw early and there is no
rollover, inducing full liquidation and thus resulting in
illiquidity and insolvency of both the government and
the banking sector.
EH ∈ [B,B + D˜I) Bank run (ωH , ηH) = (1, αB): Investors purchase
government debt, but all consumers withdraw early.
Although there is full liquidation, the government is
still able fully to serve its debt.
EH ≥ B + D˜I No bank run, but costly deposit insurance
(ωH , ηH) = (pi, αB): Investors purchase government
debt, and only impatient consumers withdraw early.
However, the deposit insurance scheme becomes costly.
The proof of Proposition 2.3 can be found in the Appendix. Let us discuss
these results in some more depth. In the first case, the home country has weak
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fiscal fundamentals; a sovereign debt crisis abroad will always trigger a twin
crisis in the home country as well. In the second case, EH is in an intermediate
range and the home country can repay its debt for sure, but it cannot provide
a credible deposit insurance. In this case, banks in the home country make a
loss of λpic∗1 = λαB, forcing them to liquidate a share of their loan portfolio,
which triggers a bank run. Finally, in the third case, the fiscal fundamentals
are strong and the home country can credibly promise to repay its debt and
insure its deposits. Therefore, the home country can rule out a bank run at
home once the foreign country defaults. However, the crisis abroad remains
contagious in that banks incur a loss of λαB. Because the remaining funds
of banks in t = 2 are smaller than (1 − pi)c∗1 by Assumption 2.5, the deposit
insurance scheme has to step in. The results of Proposition 2.3 are depicted
in the lower area of Figure 2.3, for EF < B. The three different scenarios are
represented by the areas I to III.
2.3.3 Optimal Policies: Supranational Institutions
We have seen that a crisis abroad causes real losses for home banks and is
thus contagious under political autarky even if the home government is able
to provide a credible deposit insurance. However, it might be possible to pre-
vent the crisis abroad through the implementation of adequate supranational
institutions. We are looking for institutions that constitute a Pareto improve-
ment compared to the situation of political autarky, in the sense that both
countries weakly benefit from this policy. We focus on two different institu-
tional setups: first, the implementation of a banking union, and second, the
joint implementation of a banking union and a fiscal union. In our model, a
banking union describes a supranational institution that provides a deposit
insurance scheme for both countries and is financed by both countries. Sim-
ilarly, in a fiscal union, both countries mutualize sovereign debt and promise
to repay the debt of both countries together.
Proposition 2.4. Assume EH + EF ≥ 2(B +DI) and EH > EF .
EF < E˜ A banking union is Pareto-efficient only if it is com-
plemented with a fiscal union.
EF ∈ [E˜, B +DI) A banking union is required for Pareto efficiency, but
a fiscal union is not necessary.
EF ≥ B +DI Remaining in political autarky is Pareto-efficient,
there is no need for a banking or fiscal union.
The threshold E˜ is defined as E˜ = B − [`I−(1−λ)pic∗1]+`I τRI.
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EF
EH
0
0
2(B +DI)
B +DI
B
B 2(B +DI)B +DI
B + D˜I
B + D˜I
I
II
III
II III
IV
V
V
VI
I Twin crisis in both countries
II Twin crisis in fiscally weak
country, bank run in fiscally
sound country
III Twin crisis in fiscally weak
country, no crisis in fis-
cally sound country, but DIS
costly
IV No contagion, no sovereign
default, independent bank-
ing crises
V No contagion, no sovereign
default, banking crisis in fis-
cally weak country
VI No crisis equilibrium
Figure 2.3: Equilibria under Political Autarky. This figure depicts the types of
crisis equilibria in the case of political autarky (each government only provides a DIS
for domestic depositors) for different values of external tax revenues EH and EF .
In region I, the crisis equilibrium is a twin crisis (sovereign default and bank run)
in both countries. In region II, the fiscally weak country defaults and experiences a
bank run, while the fiscally sound country does not default, but experiences a banking
crisis. In region III, there is a twin crisis in the fiscally weak country and no crisis in
the fiscally sound country, but the DIS is costly. In region IV, one country or both
countries experience a banking crisis, but sovereigns do not default and there is no
contagion. The banking crises can occur independently of each other. In region V,
there is a banking crisis in the fiscally weak country, but no contagion, and no crisis
in the fiscally sound country. In region VI, no crisis equilibrium exists.
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The assumption of EH + EF ≥ 2(B + DI) implies that the pooled ex-
ogenous tax revenues of both countries suffice to repay the government debt
and credibly to insure the depositors of both countries. Let us go backwards
to illustrate the results of Proposition 2.4. If EF ≥ B + DI, the foreign
government is fiscally sound and can prevent a crisis by providing a deposit
insurance scheme on its own, so Pareto efficiency is already attained under
political autarky. As soon as EF < B + DI, the foreign country cannot
provide a credible deposit insurance any more and a bank run can occur.
Therefore, a joint deposit insurance is needed. Based on the level of EF ,
we have to make one further case distinction. Notice that even though the
banking union prevents a bank run, banks might have to liquidate because
of a rollover freeze. The rollover freeze can only occur if EF < E˜. As long
as EF is above this threshold, the remaining tax revenue after liquidation
suffices to repay the government bonds B. Because the rollover freeze is ruled
out, the banking union is a sufficient measure. However, if the exogenous tax
revenue falls below this threshold, the rollover freeze can only be ruled out
by the additional implementation of a fiscal union through which the home
government guarantees the repayment of foreign government debt.
The results are depicted in Figure 2.4. Proposition 2.4 is concerned with
the area above the dashed line, where EH +EF ≥ 2(B+DI). In region (i) no
union is required. A banking union is strict Pareto improvement in regions
(ii) and (iii), whereas in region (iv) the implementation of both a banking and
a fiscal union is required.
We conclude that if the countries are sufficiently different with respect to
their exogenous tax revenue, it may be beneficial for both countries to form
a banking union as this eliminates the adverse crisis equilibrium at no costs.
Discussion
Notice that there is no uncertainty regarding fiscal soundness in our model,
i.e., it is clear which country is fiscally weak and which country is fiscally
strong. However, both countries have an incentive to form a banking union or
even a fiscal union. The type of unions discussed can therefore be understood
as something that is different from typical insurance against potential adverse
states in the future. A typical insurance would be a contract between agents
which is signed before relevant states are realized and which aims at insuring
at least one of the contracting parties. Typically, there is ex post one party
that makes losses on the contract because it has to transfer net funds to the
other party.
In our case, however, the insurance contract can be signed after the values of
external tax revenues, EH and EF , are realized because there is no transfer of
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EF
EH
0
0
2(B +DI)
B +DI
B
E˜
BE˜ 2(B +DI)B +DI
B + D˜I
B + D˜I
(v)
(iv)
(iv)
(iii)
(iii)
(ii)
(ii)
(i)
(i) Political autarky is Pareto-
efficient, no crisis
(ii) Banking union is a Pareto
improvement, fiscally weak
country benefits
(iii) Banking union is a Pareto
improvement, both coun-
tries benefit
(iv) Fiscal and banking union is
a Pareto improvement
(v) Crisis cannot be prevented
Figure 2.4: Efficient Policy Measures. This figure depicts regions in which the crisis
equilibrium can be eliminated by either a banking union or the joint implementation
of a Banking and fiscal union for different values of external tax revenues EH and
EF . In region (i), a crisis equilibrium does not exist even under political autarky,
thus a union is not needed. In region (ii), a banking union stabilizes the weaker
country by ruling out a bank run. While it does not benefit the stronger country,
it does not cost anything either. In region (iii), the banking union rules out a bank
run and a sovereign default of the weaker country, thus benefiting both countries.
Finally, in region (iv), the banking union is not effective anymore. Here, only the
joint implementation of banking and fiscal union can eliminate the crisis, and it is
costless for both countries. If the sum of exogenous tax revenues is too small, it is
not possible to rule out crisis equilibria by forming a union (region (v)). While the
fiscally stronger country might experience neither a sovereign default nor a bank run,
it suffers whenever the weaker country experiences a sovereign default.
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funds from the strong to the weak country. In contrast, both countries benefit
from this atypical insurance even ex post, even though the union might be
valued more by the fiscally weak than by the fiscally strong country. Because it
is effective in preventing self-fulfilling crises, the unions are costless for both
countries. This consideration implies that if there was initial uncertainty
about which of the two countries is the strong one and which is the weak one,
both countries would have an incentive to form the union.
2.4 The European Banking Union
We now use the insights of our model to investigate the efficacy of recent
policy proposals. The proclaimed goal of the proposal for the implementation
of a banking union in the euro area is to ensure financial stability and to
break the “potentially vicious circle between banks and sovereigns” (European
Commission, 2013a).
The current proposals for the formation of a banking union consist of three
components. First, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which is sup-
posed to be complemented by a single rulebook of the European Banking
Authority (Council of the European Union, 2013). Second, the Single Resolu-
tion Mechanism (SRM) for the centralization of competencies and resources
for managing the failure of banks (European Commission, 2013b). Third, a
supranational Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS).
Currently, the first two components are already implemented (SSM) or close
to being implemented (SRM), but a supranational deposit insurance scheme
so far seems to be politically infeasible and is currently off the table (Euro-
pean Commission, 2013a). Hellwig (2014) points out several doubts about the
effectiveness of SSM and SRM at dealing with cross-boarder externalities, es-
pecially for the case of banks that operate in several countries. Furthermore,
he points out that national authorities may be unable or unwilling to provide
funding in case of a crisis, calling for a fiscal backstop at the European level.
Our model points to a further problem: We show that the lack of a suprana-
tional DGS may be a serious shortcoming of the European Banking Union,
and may undermine the overall efficacy of the proposed reforms in ensuring
financial stability.
Note that due to the stylized nature of our model there is no role for super-
vision and resolution of banks. Thus, our model remains silent on the efficacy
of the components of the banking union that have already been or are about
to be implemented (supervision and resolution). Clearly, both components
are crucial for harmonizing banking regulation on the European level and
63
Chapter 2 Sovereign Defaults, Bank Runs, and Contagion
may well be considered as a key achievement.
In turn, our model can actually say something on the supranational DGS,
the component policy makers currently seem to refuse to implement. Our
model states that if there is sufficient interdependence between countries and
a high degree of heterogeneity in the countries’ fiscal soundness, a banking
union as well as a fiscal union may eliminate the self-fulfilling crisis equilib-
rium. Observe that in fact banks are highly interconnected within the euro
area. Moreover, observe that there are countries that may be considered
fiscally sound (e.g., Germany and France), and others that may be consid-
ered fiscally weak (e.g., Spain and Italy).9 If one is willing to believe in the
self-fulfilling nature of financial crises, a deposit insurance scheme, poten-
tially complemented by a fiscal union, may implement financial stability at
no costs. This also implies that the refusal to implement a deposit insurance
scheme may lead to potentially costly contagion across countries, which could
be avoided.
A deposit insurance scheme works best if it is credible and never tested
and thus eliminates the possibility of self-fulfilling crises at no costs. In order
to understand the importance of this insight in the context of the European
situation, consider the following: Assume that there is a fiscally sound country
that would never experience a self-fulfilling crisis if it was in autarky. However,
its interdependence with another country implies its banks will realize losses
once there is a crisis in the foreign country. Thus, ensuring domestic financial
stability through, e.g., a deposit insurance scheme will become costly for the
government once its banks have realized losses. A crisis abroad may therefore
cause real costs at home once there is sufficient interdependence. Given the
self-fulfilling nature of the crisis abroad, it may be optimal for the home
country to participate in a mechanism that prevents the crisis abroad at low
(or even at zero) costs. Preventing the crisis abroad eliminates contagion and
thus ensures financial stability at home in this setting. Our model shows that
this is possible by implementing a banking union (equivalent to a joint deposit
insurance scheme in our model) which is complemented with a fiscal union if
necessary.
In order to apply this insight to the European situation, one needs to ap-
preciate the fact that a deposit insurance in fiscally weak countries may not
be credible. It may therefore not be able to prevent a banking crisis in the
9We do not consider our model to fit the case of Greece. It is more than questionable
whether Greece could have repaid its debt even if its debt had been a rolled over. The
crisis in Greece does not appear to be only self-fulfilling, but rather due to fundamen-
tal problems. Greece and Portugal rather had “old-fashioned sovereign debt crises”
(Hellwig, 2014).
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respective country, a crisis that can be contagious and thus costly for fis-
cally sound countries as well. A banking union with a joint deposit insurance
scheme may increase the credibility of the deposit insurance. In fact, the de-
posit insurance scheme may become fully credible once it is backed by fiscally
sound governments, eliminating the crisis equilibrium altogether. In fact, in
our very simple setup, such a mechanism can eliminate the crisis equilibrium
at no cost.
One may hypothesize that politicians in fiscally sound countries currently
seem to be scared of implementing a joint deposit insurance scheme. The
rationale is that it could appeal to voters as another form of mutualization
of national debt, with a clear disadvantage for taxpayers in fiscally sound
countries. E.g., German politicians may fear to scare their voters as a banking
union may imply that German tax payer can potentially be liable for losses
of, e.g., Spanish banks. Our model indicates that this may turn out to be
bitter irony: exactly the refusal of implementing a full-fledged banking union
with a joint deposit insurance scheme may make future crises more costly for
the respective tax payers.
2.5 Conclusion
Our model has two main contributions. First, we discuss how banking crises
and sovereign defaults can be contagious across countries. The setup allows
us to rationalize supranational policies that aim at preventing sovereign and
financial crises. Our specific setup gives conditions under which a fiscal and
a banking union are effective measures to eliminate an adverse run equilib-
rium. We use these results to comment on the policy debates on the making
of a banking union in the euro area. Importantly, our model indicates that a
banking union with a joint deposit insurance scheme may be a mechanism to
prevent contagious self-fulfilling banking crises. It possibly has to be comple-
mented by a fiscal union to be entirely effective. We argue that the current
proposal for a banking union, consisting only of supranational supervision
and resolution mechanisms, is insufficient to break the vicious cycle between
sovereigns and banks.
Second, the model illustrates the risks associated with banks holding gov-
ernment bonds. In our model, fragility arises whenever the fate of the govern-
ment and the financial sector are closely connected. This condition is likely
met in developed and highly leveraged financial systems where banks hold
government bonds and where economic activity depends on the performance
of the financial sector. This chapter thus sheds light on the debate regarding
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the regulation of government bonds holding by intermediaries. More specifi-
cally, it gives a rationale for why exposure of banks to sovereign risk may be
problematic.
The stylized nature of our model implies that our insights and policy im-
plications have to be taken with a grain of salt and cannot be translated
one-to-one for every institutional arrangement. In our model, we abstract
from fundamental uncertainty (i.e., macroeconomic shocks) as a source of a
crisis, and from potential moral hazard resulting from an established banking
and fiscal union. Both elements may be of importance in reality. For the
case of negative macroeconomic shocks in a foreign country, a supranational
deposit insurance may moderate a crisis, but this might come with real costs
for the home country. In addition, the presence of an international insurance
may induce a country’s institutions (government, supervision, and banks) to
gamble. Both aspects might induce fiscally strong countries to refrain from
a fiscal and an extensive banking union. This is not an argument against
such unions, though. It rather calls for detailed contractual definitions of
the union’s scope, and for strict regulation and supervision that is located
at level of the union. The SSM and SRM can mitigate such moral hazard
on the country level, and thus build the foundation which is necessary for
implementing a supranational DGS.
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Appendix 2.A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1. We first analyze proof the existence of the Type I
equilibrium where (ω, η) = (pi, αB): By Equation (2.1), banks do not engage
in liquidation, z(ω, η) = 0, yielding a late consumption of c2 = c∗2 and a
tax revenue of T = E + τRI. Assumptions 2.1 to 2.3, and Equations (2.3)
and (2.5) imply that patient consumers do not withdraw early, ω∗i (ω, η) =
0 ∀i, and outside investors roll over the debt η∗j (ω, η) = 1 ∀j. Therefore
(ω, η) = (pi, pic∗1) constitutes a Nash Equilibrium.
We now proof the existence of the Type II equilibrium. We distinguish two
cases.
E < B Sovereign default and bank run (ω, η) = (1, 0):
The liquidation is given by z(ω, η) = 1, yielding c2 = 0 and T = E. We get
ω∗i (ω, η) = 1 ∀i and η∗j (ω, η) = 0 ∀j. Therefore (ω, η) = (1, 0) constitutes a
Nash Equilibrium.
E ≥ B Bank run (ω, η) = (1, αB):
The liquidation is given by z(ω, η) = 1, yielding c2 = 0 and T = E. We get
ω∗i (ω, η) = 1 ∀i and η∗j (ω, η) = 1 ∀j. Therefore (ω, η) = (1, αB) constitutes a
Nash Equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. A sovereign default in the foreign country implies
that ηF = 0, implying that domestic banks make a loss of (1 − h)αB. As-
sumption 2.5 implies that this loss induces a liquidation which necessarily
triggers a bank run in the home country in the absence of the a deposit insur-
ance. To prove this fact, we show that even if there was rollover of sovereign
debt and no run, depositors would still prefer to run, i.e., cH2 < c∗1. In this
case, the liquidation would be zH(pi, αB, 0) = (pic∗1−(1−λ)pic∗1)/`I = λpic∗1/`I.
By Assumption 2.5, it follows that zH > c
∗
2−c∗1
c∗2
= 1− c∗1c∗2 . Late consumption is
given by cH2 (zH , pi) = (1 − zH)c∗2. It follows that cH2 (zH , pi) < (c∗1/c∗2)c∗2 = c∗1.
Therefore, the bank run is inevitable in the absence of a deposit insurance.
EH < B: Sovereign default and bank run, (ωH , ηH) = (1, 0)
Because the government cannot provide a deposit insurance, a bank run is
triggered. This leads to full liquidation and reduces the tax revenue to TH =
EH < B, inducing a sovereign default and a rollover freeze.
EH ∈ [B,B + D˜I): Bank run, (ωH , ηH) = (1, αB)
Because the government cannot provide a deposit insurance, a bank run is
triggered. This leads to full liquidation and reduces the tax revenue to TH =
EH > B. The sovereign can repay its debt, and rollover is ensured.
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EH ≥ B + D˜I: No Bank run but costly deposit insurance,
(ωH , ηH) = (pi, αB)
The government can provide a deposit insurance scheme and thus prevent
a bank run, and it can also repay its debt, ensuring the rollover of debt.
However, the deposit insurance is costly.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. Given that EF ≥ B + DI, it is immediately clear
that both countries are stable under political autarky, therefore a union is not
needed.
In the presence of a banking union, the foreign government cannot ex-
perience a sovereign debt crisis if EF ≥ E˜. Because joint funds suffice to
make a banking union credible, it prevents a run in the foreign country. If
there was a rollover freeze in the foreign country, banks would have to liqui-
date zF (pi, 0, αB) = min[1, (1 − λ)pic∗1/(`I)]. This induces a tax revenue of
TF (zF ) ≥ E˜+ [`I−(1−λ)pic∗1]+`I τRI = B. The foreign government can thus repay
its debt, and a rollover freeze cannot occur in equilibrium. Therefore, the
banking union is sufficient to eliminate any crisis altogether if EF ≥ E˜.
If however EF < E˜, a rollover freeze constitutes an equilibrium even in the
presence of a banking union which prevents a bank run. In case of a rollover
freeze, the tax revenue is given by TF (zF ) < E˜ + [`I−(1−λ)pic
∗
1]+
`I τRI = B.
Therefore, the joint implementation of the banking and the fiscal union is
required. This policy measure is costless for the home country because by
providing the deposit insurance and guaranteeing to repay all government
debt, it rules out a bank run and ensures rollover of foreign government debt.
The deposit insurance will not be tested, and because foreign banks do not
engage in liquidation, the foreign government has sufficient tax revenue to
repay its debt by itself.
Returning to the case of EF ∈ [E˜, B−DI], we can distinguish two different
scenarios. If EF ∈ [E˜, B], both countries strictly benefit from the implemen-
tation of the banking union. The foreign country does not experience any
crisis, and because the default of the foreign sovereign is ruled out, losses
of home banks on foreign government bonds are eliminated. In contrast, if
EF ∈ [B,B +DI), the foreign country will always be able to repay its debt.
Therefore, the home country cannot be affected by a crisis at all. Even if
there was a bank run in the foreign country, the home country would not
suffer because the exposure is only through foreign debt which is unaffected.
Thus, only the foreign country benefits from the banking union, but the home
country does not suffer. This distinction is illustrated by the regions (ii) and
(iii) in Figure 2.4.
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter contributes to the theoretical understanding of how shadow
banking activities can set the stage for a financial crisis. Maturity and liq-
uidity mismatch of unregulated financial intermediators – often described as
shadow banking – were a key ingredient to the 2007-09 financial crisis (Brun-
nermeier, 2009; FCIC, 2011). Prior to the crisis, the shadow banking sector
was largely involved in financing long-term real investments such as housing.
With an increase in delinquency rates of subprime mortgages, uncertainty
about the performance of returns of those investments emerged. This led to
various kinds of run-like events in the shadow banking sector, including the
collapse of the market for asset-backed commercial papers (ABCP) (Kacper-
czyk and Schnabl, 2009; Covitz et al., 2013), the counterparty runs on Bear
Stearns and Lehman Brothers in tri-party repo (Copeland et al., 2011; Krish-
namurthy et al., 2014), and the large-scale run on the money market fund in-
dustry in the aftermath of the Lehman failure (Kacperczyk and Schnabl, 2013;
Schmidt et al., 2014). The turmoil in the shadow banking sector ultimately
translated into broader financial-sector turmoil in which several commercial
banks were on the brink of failure. Ultimately, governments and central banks
had to intervene on a large scale.
We develop a model in which shadow banking emerges alongside commer-
cial banking in order to circumvent financial regulation. We show that if
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the shadow banking sector grows too large, fragility arises in the sense that
panic-based runs may occur. The size of the shadow banking sector is cru-
cial because it determines the volume of assets being sold on the secondary
market in case of a run. We assume that arbitrage capital in this market is
limited. Therefore, if the shadow banking sector is too large relative to avail-
able arbitrage capital, fire-sale prices are depressed due to cash-in-the-market
pricing, and self-fulfilling runs become possible. Moreover, if shadow banking
activities are intertwined with activities of commercial banks, a crisis in the
shadow banking sector may also trigger a crisis in the regulated banking sec-
tor. Eventually, the efficacy of existing safety nets for regulated banks may be
undermined. By considering regulatory arbitrage, our model challenges the
view that a credible deposit insurance may eliminate adverse run equilibria
in model with maturity transformation at no cost.
The term “shadow banking” was coined during the 2007-09 financial cri-
sis in order to describe financial intermediation activities that were unknown
to a broader public prior to the crisis.1 However, the term is imprecise and
ambiguous, and its definition varies substantially even within the academic
debate. Among the most prominent definitions are the ones by Pozsar et al.
(2013), by the Financial Stability Board (FSB, 2013), and by Claessens and
Ratnovski (2014).2 Building on these definitions, we use the term “shadow
banking” to describe banking activities (risk, maturity, and liquidity trans-
formation) that take place outside the regulatory perimeter of banking and
do not have direct access to public backstops, but may require backstops to
operate.
Prior to the crisis, shadow banking had evolved as a popular alternative to
commercial banking in order to finance long-term real investments via short-
term borrowing. E.g., asset-backed securities (ABS) were financed through
asset-backed commercial papers (ABCP). While the shadow banking sector
1The expression was first used by Paul McCulley at the Jackson Hole Symposium in
Wyoming, who described shadow banking as “the whole alphabet soup of levered up
non-bank investment conduits, vehicles, and structures”(McCulley, 2007).
2Pozsar et al. (2013) define shadow banking as “credit, maturity, and liquidity transforma-
tion without direct and explicit access to public sources of liquidity or credit backstops”.
The FSB (2013) describes shadow banking as “credit intermediation involving entities
and activities (fully or partially) outside the regular banking system”. Finally, Claessens
and Ratnovski (2014) propose the label “shadow banking” for “all financial activities,
except traditional banking, which require a private or public backstop to operate”. All
approaches describe shadow banking as financial activities that are similar to those of
traditional banks. While the FSB emphasizes regulatory aspects, the other two address
the access to or the need for backstops. Our definition borrows from all three and tries
to combine the different aspects.
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had a stable record prior to the crisis, its activities expanded rapidly in the
years up to the crisis (see, e.g., FCIC, 2011; FSB, 2013; Claessens et al.,
2012).3
The 2007-09 financial crisis began when an increase in delinquency rates of
subprime mortgages induced uncertainty about the performance of ABS. In
August 2007, BNP Paribas suspended convertibility of three of its funds that
were exposed to risk of subprime mortgages bundled in ABS, and there was
a sharp contraction of short-term funding of off-balance sheet conduits such
as ABCP conduits and structured investment vehicles (SIVs) that financed
their ABS holdings by issuing ABCP and medium-term notes (Kacperczyk
and Schnabl, 2009). The empirical evidence suggests that this contraction
resembled the essential features of a run-like event or a rollover freeze in
the ABCP market (see Covitz et al., 2013). Due to the breakdown of the
ABCP market and due to continuing bad news from the housing market,
the institutions that produced ABS got into trouble. This culminated in the
counterparty runs on Bear Stearns in March 2008 in tri-party repo, and finally
in the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.4 The failure of Lehman
Brothers caused further turmoil, including “Reserve Primary Fund” breaking
the buck, thus finally triggering a full-blown run on the money market fund
industry (Kacperczyk and Schnabl, 2013; Schmidt et al., 2014). Our model
contributes to the theoretical understanding for why sharp contraction in
short-term funding may occur in the shadow banking sector. In particular,
our model offers a rationale of how regulatory arbitrage may set the stage for
panic-based runs such as the run on ABCP conduits and MMFs in the 2007-
09 crises, and how such runs can also adversely affect the regulated banking
sector – even in the absence of runs on commercial banks.
We discuss a simple banking model of maturity transformation in the tra-
dition of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Qi (1994) in order to illustrate how
shadow banking can sow the seeds of a financial crisis. In our model, commer-
3The only MMF that ever broke the buck before Lehman’s default was the “Community
Bankers Money Fund” (see Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013)). Shadow banking activities
had been evolving since the 1970s and experienced a growth boost in the 1990s when
MMFs expanded their investments from government and corporate bonds towards ABS
also.
4In the direct aftermath of the crisis, the academic debate had – due to the availability
of data – largely focused on the run on repo (Gorton and Metrick, 2012). Copeland
et al. (2011) as well as Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) point out that the repo market
experienced a margin spiral in the sense of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), but did
not necessarily experience a run. The counterparty runs on Bear Stearns in tri-party
repo programs in March 2008 and the run on Lehman Brother in September 2008 are
exceptions.
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cial banks’ liabilities are covered by a deposit insurance. Because this might
induce moral hazard on the part of the banks, they are subject to regulation,
which induces regulatory costs for the banks. The shadow banking sector
competes with commercial banks in offering maturity transformation services
to investors. In contrast to commercial banks, shadow banking activities are
neither covered by the safety net nor burdened with regulatory costs.
Our first key result is that the relative size of the shadow banking sector
determines its stability. If the short-term financing of shadow banks breaks
down, they are forced to sell their securitized assets on a secondary market.
The liquidity in this market is limited by the budget of arbitrageurs. If the
size of the shadow banking sector is small relative to the capacity of this
secondary market, shadow banks can sell their assets at face value in case of a
run. Because they can raise a sufficient amount of liquidity in this way, a run
does not constitute an equilibrium. However, if the shadow banking sector is
too large, the arbitrageurs’ budget does not suffice to buy all assets at face
value. Instead, cash-in-the-market pricing à la Allen and Gale (1994) leads to
depressed fire-sale prices in case of a run. Because shadow banks cannot raise
a sufficient amount of liquidity, self-fulfilling runs constitute an equilibrium.
Depressed fire-sale prices are reminiscent of theories on the limits to arbitrage
(see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 2011) and give rise to multiple equilibria
in our model.
As a second key result we find that if commercial banks themselves operate
shadow banks, a larger size of the shadow banking sector is sustainable. In
this case, the shadow banking sector indirectly benefits from the safety net for
commercial banks. Because of this safety net, bank depositors never panic and
banks thus have additional liquid funds to support their shadow banks. This
enlarges the parameter space for which shadow banking is stable. However,
once the threat of a crisis reappears, a crisis in the shadow banking sector
also harms the sector of regulated commercial banking.
Finally, the third important result is that a safety net for banks may not
only be unable to prevent a banking crisis in the presence of regulatory arbi-
trage. In fact, it may become tested and costly for the regulator (or taxpayer).
If banks and shadow banking are separated, runs only occur in the shadow
banking sector, while the regulated commercial banking sector is unaffected.
If they are intertwined, a crisis in the shadow banking sector translates into a
system-wide crisis and ultimately the safety net becomes tested, and eventu-
ally costly, for its provider. This is at odds with the view that safety nets such
as a deposit insurance are an effective measure to prevent panic-based bank-
ing crises. In traditional banking models of maturity transformation, such as
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Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Qi (1994), credible deposit insurance can
break the strategic complementarity of investors and eliminate adverse run
equilibria at no costs, as it is never tested. The efficacy of such safety nets
was widely agreed upon until recently; see, e.g., Gorton (2012) on “creating
the quiet period”. We show that this may not be the case when regulatory ar-
bitrage is possible. Regulatory arbitrage may undermine the efficacy of safety
nets.
For most parts of this chapter we treat the shadow banking sector as con-
sisting of one vertically integrated institution. However, we show that our
model can be extended such that its structure is closer to the actual shadow
banking sector in the US prior to the crisis, see also Figure 3.5. We mostly
follow and simplify the descriptions by (Pozsar et al., 2013) and show that
all results hold when we consider a shadow banking sector that consists of in-
vestment banks (broker dealers), ABCP conduits such as special investment
vehicles (SIVs) and money market mutual funds (MMFs) instead of single
shadow banks. This also allows us to derive separate conditions for runs from
investors on MMFs and for runs from MMFs on ABCP conduits.
The main contribution of this chapter is to show how regulatory arbitrage-
induced shadow banking can contribute to the evolution of financial crises.
We illustrate how shadow banking activities undermine the effectiveness of
a safety net that is installed to prevent self-fulfilling bank runs. Moreover,
we show how shadow banking may make the safety net costly for the reg-
ulator in case of a crisis. We argue that the understanding of how shadow
banking activities contribute to the evolution of systemic risk is not only key
to understanding the recent financial crisis. Our results indicate that cir-
cumvention of regulation can generally have severe adverse consequences on
financial stability. We argue that it is an essential part of any analysis of
the efficacy of regulatory interventions to consider the extent of possible reg-
ulatory arbitrage. Thus, this chapter is not only concerned with the 07-09
crisis but attempts to make more general point on the dangers associated
with regulatory arbitrage. This may be of importance for those economies
in which shadow banking is booming such as currently in China (see Awrey,
2015; Dang et al., 2014).
While the simple nature of our model keeps the analysis tractable, we ex-
clude certain features that might be considered relevant. In our view, the most
important ones are the following two: First, in our model, a financial crisis is a
purely self-fulfilling phenomenon. We do not claim that the turmoils in sum-
mer 2007 were a pure liquidity problem. Clearly, ABCP conduits had severe
solvency problems as a consequence of increased delinquency rates. However,
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this chapter is an attempt to demonstrate how the structure of the financial
system can set the stage for a severe fragility: because of maturity mismatch
in a large shadow banking sector without an explicit safety net, small shocks
can lead to large repercussions. Second, by focusing on regulatory arbitrage
as the sole reason for the existence of shadow banking, we ignore potential
positive welfare effects of shadow banking and securitization. There are sev-
eral other rationales for why shadow banking exists: securitization can be
an effective instrument to share macroeconomic interest rate risk (Hellwig,
1994) or to cater to the demand for safe debt (Gennaioli et al., 2013); it can
make assets marketable by overcoming adverse selection problems (Gorton
and Pennacchi, 1990, 1995; Dang et al., 2013a); and it can increase the effi-
ciency of bankruptcy processes (Gorton and Souleles, 2006). In contrast, we
focus on the regulatory arbitrage hypothesis which has received considerable
support by the empirical findings of Acharya et al. (2013). Therefore, it is
important to keep in mind that whenever we speak of shadow banking and its
consequences for financial stability, we mainly address shadow banking that
originates from regulatory arbitrage. However, the fragility that we find in
our model may arguably also exists in a different context.
There is a fast-growing literature on theoretical aspects of shadow bank-
ing. Our modeling approach is related to the paper by Martin et al. (2014).
However, their focus lies on the run on repo and on the differences between
bilateral and tri-party repo in determining the stability of single financial in-
stitutions. In turn, we focus on ABCP and system-wide crises. The paper
by Bolton et al. (2011) is the first contribution to provide an origination and
distribution model of banking with multiple equilibria in which adverse selec-
tion is contagious over time. Gennaioli et al. (2013) provide a model in which
the demand for safe debt drives securitization. In their framework, fragility
in the shadow banking sector arises when tail-risk is neglected.
Other contributions that deal with shadow banking are Ordoñez (2013),
Goodhart et al. (2012, 2013), and Plantin (2014). Ordoñez focuses on po-
tential moral hazard on the part of banks. In his model, shadow banking is
potentially welfare-enhancing as it allows to circumvent imperfect regulation.
However, it is only stable if shadow banks value their reputation and thus
behave diligently; it becomes fragile otherwise. The emphasis of Goodhart
et al. lies on incorporating shadow banking into a general equilibrium model.
Plantin studies the optimal prudential capital regulation when regulatory ar-
bitrage is possible. In contrast to all three, we focus on the destabilizing
effects of shadow banking in the sense that it gives rise to run equilibria.
This chapter proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we illustrate the baseline
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model of maturity transformation. In Section 3, we extend the model by a
shadow banking sector and analyze under which conditions fragility arises. In
Section 4, we show how the results change when commercial banks themselves
operate shadow banks. Finally, we analyze different types of runs in the
shadow banking sector in Section 5, and conclude in Section 6.
3.2 A Model of Intergenerational Banking
Our baseline model is an overlapping-generation version of the model of matu-
rity transformation by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) which was first introduced
by Qi (1994).
There is an economy that goes through an infinite number of time periods
t ∈ Z. There exists a single good that can be used for consumption as well as
investment. In each period t, a new generation of investors is born, consisting
of a unit mass of agents. Each investor is born with an endowment of one
unit of the good, and her lifetime is three periods: (t, t+1, t+2). Upon birth,
all investors are identical, but in period t+ 1, their type is privately revealed:
With a probability of pi, an investor is impatient and her utility is given by
u(ct+1). With a probability of 1− pi, the investor is patient and her utility is
given by u(ct+2). Assume that the function u(·) is strictly increasing, strictly
concave, twice continuously differentiable, and satisfies the following Inada
conditions: u′(0) =∞, and u′(∞) = 0.
In each period t, there are two different assets (investment technologies):
a short asset (storage technology), and a long asset (production technology).
The short asset transforms one unit of the good at time t into one unit of the
good at t+ 1, thus effectively storing the good. The long asset is represented
by a continuum of investment projects. An investment project is a metaphor
for an agent who is endowed with a project (e.g., an entrepreneur with a
production technology or a consumer who desires to finance a house), but has
no funds she can invest.
There is no aggregate, but only idiosyncratic return risk: each investment
project requires one unit of investment in t and yields a stochastic return
of Ri units in t + 2. The return Ri is the realization of an independently
and identically distributed random variable R˜, characterized by a probabil-
ity distribution F . F is continuous and strictly increasing on some interval
[R,R] ⊂ R+, with E[Ri] = R > 1. We assume that the realization of an
investment project’s long-term return, Ri, is privately revealed to whoever
finances the project.
The idiosyncratic return risk of the long asset implies that financial inter-
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mediaries dominate a financial markets solution in terms of welfare because of
adverse selection in the financial market.5 In turn, unlike participants of a fi-
nancial market, a financial intermediary will not be subject to these problems
as he is able to diversify and create assets that are not subject to asymmetric
information.
Finally, an investment project may be physically liquidated prematurely
in t + 1, yielding a liquidation return of `Ri/R, where ` ∈ (0, 1/R). The
liquidation return of a project thus depends on the project’s stochastic long-
term return. The average liquidation return of a project is equal to `.
Intergenerational Banking
In the following, we describe the mechanics of intergenerational banking and
derive steady state equilibria, closely following Qi (1994). We assume that
there is a banking sector operating in the economy, consisting of identical
infinitely lived banks that take deposits and make investments. It is assumed
that the law of large numbers applies at the bank level, i.e., a bank neither
faces uncertainty regarding the fraction of impatient investors nor regarding
the aggregate return of the long asset.
In each period t ∈ Z, banks receive new deposits Dt. They sign a demand-
deposit contract with investors which specifies a short and a long interest
rate. Per unit of deposit, an investor is allowed either to withdraw rt,1 units
after one period, or rt,2 units after two periods. In period t, banks yield the
returns from the last period’s investment in storage, St−1, and the returns
from investment in the production technology in the second but last period,
It−2. They can use these funds to pay out withdrawing investors and to make
new investment in the production and in the storage technology.
We are interested in steady states of this intergenerational banking. A
steady state is given by a collection of payoffs, i.e., a short and a long interest
rate, (r1, r2), a deposit decision D, and an investment decisions I and S.
We are only interested in those steady states in which investors deposit all
their funds in the banks, D = 1, and the total investment in the storage and
production technology does not exceed new deposits, i.e., S + I ≤ D.6 This
5Because asset quality is not observable, there is only one market price. Impatient con-
sumers with high-return assets have an incentive to liquidate them instead of selling
them, and patient consumers with low-return assets have an incentive to sell. This
drives the market price below average return and inhibits the implementation of the
first-best.
6Steady states with S+I > D also exists, but in those equilibria, banks have some wealth
which is kept constant over time, the net returns of which are payed out to investors
each period. This scenario does not appear particularly plausible or interesting.
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yields the investment constraint
S + I ≤ 1. (3.1)
Moreover, we restrict attention to those steady states in which only impatient
consumers withdraw early. We will show later that these withdrawal decisions
as well as the deposit decision are actually optimal choices in a steady state
equilibrium. In such a steady state, banks have to pay pir1 units to impatient
investors and (1 − pi)r2 units to patient consumers in every period. Since
payoffs and investments are limited by returns and new deposits, the following
resource constraint must hold:
pir1 + (1− pi)r2 + S + I ≤ RI + S + 1. (3.2)
This constraint can be simplified to obtain a simple feasibility condition for
steady-state payoffs:
Definition 3.1 (Steady-state Payoff). A steady-state payoff (r1, r2) is budget
feasible if
pir1 + (1− pi)r2 ≤ (R− 1)I + 1. (3.3)
In a next step, we want to select the optimal steady state among the set of
budget feasible steady states. Our objective is to choose the steady state that
maximizes the welfare of a representative generation of investors, or equiva-
lently, the expected utility of one representative investor. We can partition
this analysis by deriving the optimal investment behavior of banks in a first
step, and then addressing the optimal interest rates. We see that the budget
constraint (3.3) is not influenced by S. Thus, the banks’ optimal investment
behavior follows directly:
Lemma 3.1 (Optimal Investment). The optimal investment behavior of banks
is given by I = 1 and S = 0, i.e., there is no investment in storage. The budget
constraint reduces to
pir1 + (1− pi)r2 ≤ R. (3.4)
The intergenerational feature of banking implies that storage is not needed
for the optimal provision of liquidity. Any investment in storage would be
inefficient and would hence imply a deterioration.
We can now derive the optimal steady-state payoffs (r1, r2), i.e., the optimal
division between long and short interest rate. It is straightforward to see that
the first-best steady-state payoff is given by perfect consumption smoothing,
(rFB1 , rFB2 ) = (R,R). However, the first-best cannot be implemented as it
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is not incentive compatible. The incentive-compatibility and participation
constraints are given by
r1 ≤ r2, (3.5)
r21 ≤ r2, (3.6)
and r2 ≥ R. (3.7)
Constraint (3.5) ensures that patient investors wait until the last period of
their lifetime instead of withdrawing early and storing their funds. Constraint
(3.6) ensures that patient investors do not withdraw early and re-deposit their
funds. By this type of re-investment, investors can earn the short interest rate
twice. As long as net returns are positive, the latter condition is stronger,
implying that the yield curve must not be decreasing. Finally, constraint (3.7)
ensures that investors do not engage in private investment and side-trading.
In fact, this condition is the upper bound to the side-trading constraint. The
adverse selection problem induced by the idiosyncratic return risk relaxed this
constraint, but the constraint will turn out not to be binding anyhow.
Obviously, constraint (3.6) is violated in the first-best, inducing patient
investors to withdraw early and to deposit their funds in the banks a second
time. In the second-best, constraints (3.4) and (3.6) are binding, resulting in
a flat yield curve, r2 = r21. Following Equation (3.4), the interest rate is such
that
pir1 + (1− pi)r21 = R. (3.8)
Proposition 3.1 (Qi 1994). In the second-best steady state, the intergenera-
tional banking sector collects the complete endowment, D = 1, and exclusively
invests in the long-asset, I = 1. In exchange, banks offer demand-deposit con-
tracts with a one-period interest rate given by
r∗1 =
√
pi2 + 4(1− pi)R− pi
2(1− pi) , (3.9)
and a two-period interest rate given by
r∗2 = r∗1
2. (3.10)
It holds that r∗2 > R > r∗1 > 1. Unlike in the Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
model, the first-best and the second-best do not coincide. The intergenera-
tional structure introduces the new IC constraint that the long interest rate
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must be sufficiently larger than the short one in order to keep patient investors
from withdrawal and reinvestment.7
Steady-State Equilibrium
Until now, we have not formally specified the game in a game-theoretic sense.
Consider the infinite game where in each period t ∈ Z, investors born in
period t decide whether to deposit, and investors born in t−1 decide whether
to withdraw or to wait for one more period. We do not engage in a full
game-theoretic analysis. In particular, we do not characterize all equilibria
of this game, but only focus on the equilibrium characterized by the above
steady state, and analyze potential deviations. Banks are assumed to behave
mechanically according to this steady state.
Lemma 3.2. The second-best steady state constitutes an equilibrium of the
infinite game.
If all investors deposit their funds in the banks, and if only impatient con-
sumers withdraw early, it is in fact individually optimal for each investor to do
the same. The second-best problem already incorporates the incentive com-
patibility constraints as well as the participation constraint. Patient investors
have no incentive to withdraw early, given that all other patient investors be-
have in the same way and given that new investors deposit in the bank. Nor
do investors have an incentive to invest privately in the production or storage
technology, as the bank offers a weakly higher long-run return that R.
Fragility
We will now study the stability of intergenerational banking in the absence
of a deposit insurance. Models of maturity transformation such as Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) and Qi (1994) may exhibit multiple equilibria in their
subgames. Strategic complementarity between the investors may give rise to
equilibria in which all investors withdraw early, i.e., bank run equilibria.
In the following, we analyze the subgame starting in period t under the
assumption that behavior until date t−1 is as in the second-best steady-state
equilibrium. We derive the condition under which banks might experience a
run by investors, i.e., the condition for the existence of a run equilibrium in
the period-t subgame. In the case of intergenerational banking, we consider a
“run” in period t to be an event in which all investors born in t− 1 withdraw
7However, the intergenerational structure also relaxes the feasibility constraint. Although
the yield curve is allowed to be decreasing in the model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983),
the second-best of intergenerational banking dominates the first-best of Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) for a large set of utility functions because banks do not have to rely on
inefficient storage.
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their funds, and none of the newly-born investors deposit their endowment. In
case of such a run, the bank has to liquidate funds in order to serve withdraw-
ing investors. In addition to the expected withdrawal of impatient consumers,
the bank now also has to serve one additional generation of patient investors
withdrawing early.
Lemma 3.3. Assume that the economy is in the second-best steady state. In
case of a run, the banks’ liquidity shortfall is (1− pi)r∗1.
Proof. In case of such a run in period t, banks have to repay what they have
invested on behalf of the mass of (1− pi) patient investors in t− 2 who have
claims worth r∗12. Moreover, they have to pay all funds that they invested on
behalf of those investors from t − 1 who have claims worth r∗1. Banks thus
need a total amount of (1− pi)r∗12 + r∗1 in case of a run.
However, banks only have an amount R of liquid funds available in t from
the investment they made in t − 2. Recall from Proposition 3.1 that pir∗1 +
(1− pi)r∗12 = R. The banks’ liquidity shortfall in case of a run by investors is
thus given by
(1− pi)r∗12 + r∗1 −R = (1− pi)r∗1. (3.11)
Let us assume that the liquidation rate is sufficiently small relative to the
potential liabilities of banks in case of a run:
Assumption 3.1. ` < (1− pi)r∗1.
Assumption 3.1 implies that, if in some period t all depositors withdraw
their funds and newborn investors do not deposit their endowment, the liqui-
dation return that the bank can realize does not suffice to serve all withdraw-
ing consumers. Therefore, the bank is illiquid and insolvent.
Proposition 3.2. Assume that the economy is in the second-best steady state.
In the subgame starting in period t, a run of investors on banks constitutes
an equilibrium.
This proposition states that the steady state is fragile in the sense that
there is scope for a run. Assumption 3.1 implies that it is optimal for a
patient investor to withdraw early if all other patient investors do so and if
new investors do not deposit. Note that Proposition 3.2 only states that a run
is an equilibrium of a subgame, but does not say anything about equilibria of
the whole game. However, our emphasis lies on the stability/fragility of the
steady-state equilibrium.
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An important insight from Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Qi (1994) is
that a credible deposit insurance may actually eliminate the adverse equi-
librium at no cost. If the insurance is credible, it eliminates the strategic
complementarity and is thus never tested. In fact, this is also true in the
setup described above. Assume that there is a regulator that can cover the
liquidity shortfall in any contingency, including a full-blown bank run. In the
context of our model, this amounts to assuming that the regulator has funds
of (1− pi)r∗1 − ` at its disposal in any period. Whenever patient investors are
guaranteed an amount r∗1 by the regulator, they do not have an incentive to
withdraw early.8 In contrast, this does not hold in the presence of regulatory
arbitrage, as we will show in the following sections.
3.3 Banks and Shadow Banks
We now extend the model described above by three elements: First, we make
the assumption that commercial banks are covered by a safety net, but are
also subject to regulation and therefore have to bear regulatory costs. Second,
there are unregulated shadow banks that compete with banks by also offering
maturity transformation services. Investors can choose whether to deposit
their funds in a bank or in the shadow bank. Depositing in the shadow
bank is associated with some opportunity cost that varies across investors.
Third, there is a secondary market in which shadow banks can sell their
assets to arbitrageurs. The amount of liquidity in this market is assumed to
be exogenous.
In the following, we describe the extended setup in detail and derive the
steady-state equilibrium, before analyzing whether the economy is stable or
whether it features multiple equilibria and panic-based runs may occur.
Commercial Banking and Regulatory Costs
From now on, we assume that commercial banks are covered by a safety net
that is provided by some unspecified regulator, ruling out runs in the com-
mercial banking sector.9 Because of this safety net, banks are not disciplined
by their depositors, such that – in a richer model – moral hazard could arise.
8We ignore the possibility for suspension of convertibility. Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
already indicate that suspension of convertibility is critical if there is uncertainty about
the fraction of early and late consumers. Moreover, as Qi (1994) shows, suspension of
convertibility is also ineffective if withdrawing depositors are paid out by new depositors.
9The regulator is assumed to have sufficient funds to provide a safety net. Moreover, he
can commit to actually applying the safety net in case it is necessary, i.e., in case of a
run.
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We therefore assume that banks are regulated (e.g., they are subject to a
minimum capital requirement). This is assumed to be costly for the bank.
In what follows, we will not model the moral hazard explicitly and assume
that regulatory costs are exogenous. However, in Appendix 3.A we provide
an extension of our model in which we illustrate how moral hazard may arise
from the existence of the safety net, and why costly regulation is necessary
to prevent moral hazard. The presence of a credible deposit insurance im-
plies that depositors have no incentive to monitor their bank. Because banks
have limited liability, this gives bankers an incentive to engage in excessive
risk-taking or to invest in assets with private benefits. This in turn calls for
regulatory interventions, e.g., in the form of minimal capital requirements
which are costly for bank managers.
We assume that banks have to pay a regulatory cost γ per unit invested in
the long asset, resulting in a gross return of R − γ. We further assume that
regulatory costs are not too high, i.e., even after subtracting the regulatory
costs, the long asset is still more attractive than storage.
Assumption 3.2. R > 1 + γ.
Because of the lower gross return, banks can now only offer a per-period
interest rate rb such that
pirb + (1− pi)r2b = R− γ. (3.12)
Under this regulation, the interest rate on bank deposits is explicitly given
by
rb =
√
pi2 + 4(1− pi)(R− γ)− pi
2(1− pi) . (3.13)
The banking sector thus functions like the banking sector in the previous
section. The only difference is that banks cannot transfer the gross return R
to investors, but only the return net of regulatory cost, R− γ.
Shadow Banks
We now introduce a shadow banking sector that also offers credit, liquidity,
and maturity transformation to investors. We start out with very simple
structure of the financial system, see Figure 3.1. Shadow banks, like regular
banks, invest in long assets and transform these investments into short-term
claims. In this section, we do not distinguish between different actors in the
shadow banking sector, but assume that there is one representative, vertically
integrated institution that we call shadow bank. This shadow bank is essen-
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Figure 3.1: Structure of the Financial System. Shadow banks, like regular banks,
invest in long assets and transform these investments into short-term claims. There
is a secondary market in which shadow banks can sell their assets to arbitrageurs.
tially identical to a commercial bank, with the exception that its deposits
are not insured, and that it is not subject to the same regulation. While by
legal standards shadow banks do not offer demand deposits in reality, they
do issue claims that are essentially equivalent to demand deposits, such as
equity shares with a stable net assets value (stable NAV). For tractability, we
will assume that shadow banks are literally taking demand deposits.
We assume that shadow banks are subject to some shadow-banking cost.
We assume that shadow banks face some cost of managing their loan portfolio,
of securitizing loans, and of reporting to their investors. Since shadow banking
is not completely unregulated, they might also incur some cost of regulation
which is substantially smaller than that or regular banks. Finally, shadow
banking cost may also include the cost of finding regulatory loopholes that
allow to conduct shadow banking in the first place.
Shadow banks invest in a continuum of long assets with idiosyncratic returns
Ri. As the law of large numbers is assumed to apply, the return of their
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portfolio is R. Similar to regulatory costs, shadow banking is assumed to
come with a per-unit cost of ρ. Therefore, the per-unit return of assets in
the shadow banking sector is R − ρ. Similar to the regulatory cost γ, we
also assume that the shadow-banking cost is not too high, i.e., even after
subtracting the shadow-banking cost, the long asset is still more attractive
than storage:
Assumption 3.3. R > 1 + ρ.
Given this shadow-banking cost, shadow banks offer a per-period interest
rate rsb to investors such that
pirsb + (1− pi)r2sb = R− ρ, (3.14)
implying a return of
rsb =
√
pi2 + 4(1− pi)(R− ρ)− pi
2(1− pi) . (3.15)
Secondary Markets and Arbitrageurs
There exists a secondary market for the shadow banks’ assets. The potential
buyers on this market are arbitrageurs who have an outside option with a
risk-free return of rˆ, i.e., they are willing to buy the shadow banks’ assets
at a price that offers them a safe return of at least rˆ. Arbitrageurs can be
thought of as experts (pension funds, hedge funds) that do not necessarily
hold such assets in normal times, but purchase them if they are available at
some discounts and thus promise gains from arbitrage. Moreover, we assume
that arbitrageurs do not want to deposit their funds in shadow banks because
their outside option is more attractive:
Assumption 3.4. rˆ > rsb.
This reservation interest rate implies that arbitrageurs’ reservation price for
an asset with a return of R− ρ is given by pa = (R− ρ)/rˆ.
Assume that there is no market power on any side of the secondary mar-
ket. Moreover, there is a fixed amount of cash in this market. We assume
that arbitrageurs have a total budget of A, implying that cash-in-the-market
pricing can occur. The equilibrium supply and price of shadow banks’ assets
on the secondary market will be derived below.
The idea behind this assumption is that not every individual or institution
has the expertise to purchase these financial products. Moreover, the equity
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and collateral of these arbitrageurs is limited, so they cannot borrow and
invest infinite amounts.10
Upon birth, investors can choose whether to deposit their endowment in a
regulated bank or in a shadow bank. Depositing at shadow bank comes at
some opportunity cost. We assume that investors are initially located at a
regulated bank. Switching to a shadow bank comes at a cost of si, where si is
independently and identically distributed according to the distribution func-
tion G. We assume that G is a continuous function that is strictly increasing
on its support R+, and that G(0) = 0. The switching cost is assumed to enter
into the investors’ utility additively separable from the consumption utility.
This switching cost should not be taken literally. One can think of these
costs as monitoring or screening costs for investors that become necessary
when choosing a shadow bank (e.g., an MMF) as these are not protected
by a deposit insurance (see Appendix 3.A for more details). For simplicity,
we have assumed that all depositors have the same size. However, we could
alternatively come up with a model where investors have different endowments
(see Appendix 3.B). It is very plausible that the ratio of switching costs to
the endowment is lower for larger investors (e.g., for corporations that need to
store liquid funds of several millions for a few days). Another interpretation
is the forgone service benefits that depositors lose when leaving commercial
banks, such as payment services and ATMs.
Investors’ Behavior
Given the interest rates of commercial banks, rb, of shadow banks, rsb, and
given the switching cost distribution G, we can pin down the size of the
shadow banking sector.
Lemma 3.4. Assume that banks offer an interest rate rb and shadow banks
offer an interest rate of rsb, as specified above. Then there exists a unique
threshold s∗ such that an investor switches to a shadow bank if and only if
si ≤ s∗. The mass of investors depositing in the shadow banking sector is
given by G(s∗). It holds that s∗ = f(γ, ρ), where fγ > 0 and fρ < 0.
Proof. Take rb and rsb as described above. We know rb decreases in γ, and
rsb decreases ρ. Staying at a commercial bank provides an investor with an
expected consumption utility of EUb = piu(rb) + (1 − pi)u(r2b ). Switching to
a shadow bank is associated with an expected consumption utility of EUsb =
piu(rsb) + (1− pi)u(r2sb). Observe that EUb decreases in γ and EUsb decreases
in ρ.
10See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for a theory on the limits to arbitrage.
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An investor with switching cost si switches to the shadow banking sector
if EUb < EUsb − si. This implies that all investors with si ≤ EUsb − EUb
switch to shadow banks. We define s∗ ≡ f(γ, ρ) = EUsb(ρ) − EUb(γ). A
mass G(s∗) of each generation’s investors switches to shadow banks, and a
mass 1 − G(s∗) stays at commercial banks. Because u is twice continuously
differentiable, it holds that ∂EUb/∂γ < 0 and ∂EUsb/∂ρ > 0. Thus, f is a
continuously differentiable function with fγ > 0 and fρ < 0.
An investor with si = s∗ is indifferent between depositing at a bank or a
shadow bank. All investors with lower switching costs choose a shadow; their
mass is given by G(s∗). The size of the shadow banking sector increases in
the regulatory cost γ and decreases in the shadow-banking cost ρ. For the
case of logarithmic utility, the switching point is given by s∗ = (2− pi)γ − ρ.
We are now equipped to characterize the economy’s steady state equilib-
rium:
Proposition 3.3. In the second-best steady-state equilibrium, the intergener-
ational banking sector collects an amount of deposits Db = 1−G(s∗) in each
period, and invests all funds in the long-asset, Ib = 1 − G(s∗). They offer
demand-deposit contracts with a per-period interest rate of
rb =
√
pi2 + 4(1− pi)(R− γ)− pi
2(1− pi) . (3.16)
Shadow banks collect an amount of deposits Dsb = G(s∗) and exclusively invest
in ABS, Isb = 1 − G(s∗). They offer a demand-deposit contracts with a per-
period interest rate of
rsb =
√
pi2 + 4(1− pi)(R− ρ)− pi
2(1− pi) . (3.17)
It holds that s∗ = f(γ, ρ), where fγ > 0 and fρ < 0. There are no assets
traded in the secondary market.
Proposition 3.3 described the steady state in which regulated commercial
banks and shadow banks coexist. The interest rates are given by rb and rsb and
depend on γ and ρ, which determines the size of the shadow banking sector as
described by Lemma 3.4. It is important to notice that, in this steady-state
equilibrium, no assets are being sold to arbitrageurs on the secondary market,
as there are no gains from trade.
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3.3.1 Fragility of Shadow Banks
As in the previous section, we now study the stability of shadow banks. We
analyze the subgame starting in period t under the assumption that behavior
until date t−1 is as in the steady-state equilibrium specified in Proposition 3.3.
We derive the condition under which shadow banks might experience a run
by investors, i.e., the condition for the existence of a run equilibrium in the
period-t subgame.
Because deposits in the shadow banking sector are not insured, a run on
shadow banks is not excluded per se. However, as will become clear below,
runs only occur if the shadow banking sector is too large. Generally, there are
two types of runs that could potentially take place in the adverse equilibrium
of the t = 1 subgame.
In our model, a run is the event where all old investors withdraw their funds
from shadow banks, and new investors do not deposit any new funds. Whether
a run on shadow banks constitutes an equilibrium depends on whether shadow
banks can raise enough liquidity in the secondary market to serve all their
obligations.
Lemma 3.5. Assume that the economy is in the second-best steady state. In
case of a run on shadow banks, their liquidity shortfall is given by G(s∗)(1−
pi)rsb.
Proof. See proof of Lemma 3.3. (1 − pi)rsb is the relative liquidity shortfall,
the amount of missing liquidity per unit of investment in the shadow banking
sector.
In order to cover this shortfall, shadow banks can either sell their investment
of period t − 1 to the arbitrageurs, or they can liquidate these assets.11 We
assume that liquidation of assets will never be enough to cover the shortfall:
Assumption 3.5. ` < (1− pi)rsb.
This assumption implies that the liquidation value is sufficiently smaller
than the long-run net return R−ρ. Similar to Assumption 3.1, also in the case
of shadow banks, which pay a per-period interest of rsb, liquidation cannot
be used to serve investors.
In the last section, the assumption of a low liquidation value implied that
(in the absence of a deposit insurance) a run on banks can always occur.
The presence of arbitrageurs who are willing to buy shadow banks’ assets in
11Liquidation is not essential to our model. It also goes through in case liquidation is not
possible; we can just set ` = 0.
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a secondary market implies that the threat of a run is not necessarily om-
nipresent. We will show that the arbitrageurs’ valuation of these assets and,
more importantly, the size of their budget determines whether run equilibria
exist.
Lemma 3.6. Assume that the economy is in the second-best steady state. A
run on shadow banks constitutes an equilibrium of the period-t subgame if
R− ρ
rˆ
< (1− pi)rsb. (3.18)
If the arbitrageurs’ outside option is very profitable, they are only willing
to pay a low price. If this price is lower than the relative liquidity shortfall, a
run is always self-fulfilling. Shadow banks have to sell their assets, and the re-
sulting revenue does not suffice to serve all investors because the arbitrageurs’
valuation and thus the market price are too low.
From now on, we will assume that the arbitrageurs’ outside option is not
too profitable, i.e., their reservation price is sufficiently large:
Assumption 3.6. (R− ρ)/rˆ ≥ (1− pi)rsb.
Observe that, in case of a run shadow banks’ supply is partially inelastic
as they have to cover their complete liquidity shortfall. There are two cases
to be considered: In the first case, the arbitrageurs’ funds are sufficient to
purchase all funds the shadow banks sell at face value, while in the second
case, the arbitrageurs’ budget is not sufficient and the price is determined by
cash-in-the-market pricing. Runs on shadow banks constitutes an equilibrium
only in this second case.
Proposition 3.4. Assume that the economy is in the second-best steady state.
A run on shadow banks constitutes an equilibrium of the period-t subgame if
and only if
G(s∗) > A(1− pi)rsb ≡ ξ. (3.19)
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Assume that investors collectively withdraw funds
from shadow banks and deposit no new funds in period t. It will be optimal
for a single investor also to withdraw if the shadow banks become illiquid and
insolvent in t.
Recall from Lemma 3.5 that the liquidity shortfall of shadow banks in case
of a run is given by LS = G(s∗)(1− pi)rsb. Liquidating all assets would yield
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G(s∗)`. According to Assumption 3.5, this will always be less than the liquid-
ity shortfall. Shadow banks will never be able to cover the liquidity shortfall
by liquidating their assets.
The relevant question is whether shadow banks can raise sufficient funds by
selling their assets to arbitrageurs. There are two conditions which are jointly
necessary and sufficient: First, the funds of arbitrageurs have to exceed the
liquidity shortfall, and second, the arbitrageurs’ valuation of shadow banks’
assets has to exceed the liquidity shortfall. The second condition is met by
assumption.
Regarding the first condition, there are two cases to be considered: In the
first case, the arbitrageurs’ funds exceed the liquidity shortfall. Because the
shortfall by assumption is lower than the valuation of arbitrageurs, their funds
are sufficient to purchase all funds the shadow banks sell at the reservation
price. In the second case, the arbitrageurs’ budget is not sufficient, and the
price is determined by cash-in-the-market pricing.
The first case is given by A ≥ (1 − pi)rsbG(s∗). All assets held by shadow
banks can be sold at the arbitrageurs’ reservation price pa = (R − ρ)/rˆ.
Because the arbitrageurs’ valuation of shadow banks’ assets as well as the
amount of cash in the market exceeds the shadow banks’ potential liquidity
needs, all investors could be served in case of a run. It thus is a strictly
dominant strategy for each old patient investor not to withdraw, and for new
investors to deposit new funds, and a run does not constitute an equilibrium.
The second case is given by A < (1−pi)rsbG(s∗). In this case, shadow banks
cannot sell all their assets at the arbitrageurs’ reservation price. If all existing
investors withdraw and no new investors deposit, shadow banks cannot raise
the required funds to fulfill their obligations by selling their assets because the
amount of assets on the secondary market exceeds the budget of arbitrageurs.
The asset price drops below the reservation price and shadow banks are forced
to sell their entire portfolio. Still, shadow banks can only raise a total amount
A of liquidity, which is insufficient to serve withdrawing investors. It follows
that, in this case, it is optimal for old and new investors to withdraw and not
to deposit, respectively. A run thus constitutes an equilibrium if and only if
the stated condition is satisfied.
The key mechanism giving rise to multiple equilibria is cash-in-the-market
pricing (see, e.g., Allen and Gale, 1994) in the secondary market for long
assets. It results from limited arbitrage capital and is related to the notion
of limits to arbitrage (see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). The fact that
there are not enough arbitrageurs (and that these arbitrageurs cannot raise
enough funds) to purchase all assets of the shadow banks can induce the price
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Figure 3.2: Fire-sale Prices. This graph depicts the potential fire-sale prices of
shadow banks’ securities. Whenever G(s∗) ≤ ξ = A/(1 − pi)rsb, arbitrageurs’ funds
suffice to purchase all assets of shadow banks at face value. In the unique equilibrium
of the period-t subgame, there are no panic-based withdrawals from shadow banks.
In turn, if G(s∗) > ξ, the funds of arbitrageurs are insufficient, and the period-t
subgame has multiple equilibria. If all investors withdraw from shadow banks, the
price in the secondary market drops to the red line.
of assets to fall short of pa. This implies that shadow banks may in fact be
unable to serve their obligations once they sell all their long-term securities
prematurely. This, in turn, makes it optimal for investors to run on shadow
banks once all other investors run.
In order to illustrate the role of limited availability of arbitrage capital we
examine the hypothetical fire-sale price. Cash-in-the-market pricing describes
a situation where the buyers’ budget constraint is binding and the supply is
fixed. The price adjusts such that demand balances the fixed supply. If the
arbitrageurs’ budget is a binding resource constraint, the price p is such that
pG(s∗) = A. (3.20)
The fire-sale price is a function of the amount of assets that are on the
market in case of a run on the shadow banking sector, which is given by the
size of the shadow banking sector G(s∗). The price is given by
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p(s∗) =

(R− ρ)/rˆ if G(s∗) ≤ ξ,
A/G(s∗) if G(s∗) ∈ (ξ, A/`] ,
` if G(s∗) > A/`.
(3.21)
The equilibrium fire-sale prices as a function of the size of the shadow
banking sector is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
0
0
R− 1
γ
R− 1 ρ
No Shadow Banking
G(s∗) = 0
Stable
Shadow Banking
0 < G(s∗) < ξ
Fragility
G(s∗) > ξ
Figure 3.3: Existence of Equilibria. This figure visualizes the equilibrium charac-
teristics of the financial system for different values of γ and ρ. For γ < ρ, shadow
banking is not made use of in equilibrium, as it is dominated by commercial banking.
If γ > ρ, the shadow banking sector has positive size. As long as the difference γ− ρ
is small, shadow banking is stable. If the difference increases, the size of the shadow
banking sector also increases and finally introduces fragility into the financial system.
Whether the period t subgame has multiple equilibria ultimately depends
on the parameters ρ and γ, as they determine the size of the shadow banking
sector. This is depicted in Figure 3.3. Whenever the regulatory costs γ
exceed the shadow-banking costs ρ (i.e., above the 45 degree line), the shadow
banking sector has positive size in equilibrium, i.e. G(s∗) > 0. However, as
long as the shadow banking sector is small relative to the arbitrageurs’ budget,
it is stable. Only when regulatory costs γ are sufficiently larger than shadow-
banking cost ρ does the size G(s∗) of the shadow banking sector exceed the
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critical threshold ξ, and shadow banking becomes fragile.
3.3.2 Liquidity Guarantees
So far, there has been no connection between the regulated commercial bank-
ing sector and the shadow banking sector; both sectors compete for the in-
vestors’ funds. We now assume that commercial banks themselves actively
engage in shadow banking: They engage in shadow banking through off-
balance sheet subsidiaries, i.e., they operate shadow banks as documented in
Acharya et al. (2013). Our model provides a positive analysis, the fact that
banks engage in shadow banking themselves does not result from optimal be-
havior in our setup. We assume that commercial banks explicitly or implicitly
provide their shadow banks with liquidity guarantees. They may have strong
incentives to support their conduits in case of distress, e.g., in order to protect
their reputation, see Segura (2014). Moreover, we assume that commercial
banks can sell their assets on the same secondary market as shadow banks.12
As above, we assume that the commercial banks’ demand-deposit liabilities
are covered by a credible safety net. This safety net being credible implies
that commercial banks do not experience runs by investors. Patient investors
who are located at a commercial bank will thus never withdraw their funds
early.
Liquidity guarantees imply that in case of a run on shadow banks, commer-
cial banks supply them with liquid funds. This increases the critical size up
to which the shadow banking sector is stable. However, this comes with an
unfavorable side effect: Once this critical size is exceeded and shadow banks
experience a run, the crisis spreads to the commercial banking sector and
makes the safety net costly.
Proposition 3.5. Assume that the economy is in the second-best steady state
described in Proposition 3.3 and all shadow banks are granted liquidity guar-
antees by commercial banks. A run of investors on shadow banks constitutes
an equilibrium of the subgame starting in period t if and only if
G(s∗) > max[A, `] + 1(1− pi)rsb + 1 ≡ ϑ, (3.22)
where s∗ = f(γ, ρ). It holds that ϑ > ξ.
12It is not straightforward that banks can sell their loans on the ABS market. In case of a
crisis, however, banks might try to securitize their loan portfolio in order to sell it.
92
3.3 Banks and Shadow Banks
Proof. In case of a run, the shadow banks’ need for liquidity is given as above
by
G(s∗)(1− pi)rsb.
Banks can sell their loans on the same secondary market in case of a cri-
sis. Still, the total endowment of arbitrageurs in this market is given by A.
Therefore, either banks and shadow banks sell their assets in the secondary
market, or both types of institutions liquidate their assets. They jointly still
only raise an amount A from selling long-term securities on the secondary
market or ` units from liquidating all long assets. The maximum amount
they can raise is thus max[A, `]. On top, commercial banks also have an ad-
ditional amount 1 − G(s∗) of liquid funds available since new investors still
deposit their endowment at commercial banks because of the safety net for
commercial banks.
The liquidity guarantees by commercial banks can satisfy the shadow banks’
liquidity needs in case of a run if
max[A, `] + (1−G(s∗)) ≥ G(s∗)(1− pi)rsb, (3.23)
which is equivalent to
G(s∗) ≤ max[A, `] + 1(1− pi)rsb + 1 = ϑ. (3.24)
If G(s∗) ≤ ϑ, the liquidity guarantees suffice to satisfy the liquidity needs in
case of a run, so a run does not constitute an equilibrium. If G(s∗) > ϑ, the
liquidity guarantees do suffice to satisfy the liquidity needs in case of a run,
and a run does constitute an equilibrium.
If commercial banks themselves operate shadow banks and provide them
with liquidity guarantees, the parameter space in which shadow banking is
stable is enlarged compared to a situation without liquidity guarantees, i.e.,
the critical threshold for the size of the shadow banking sector ϑ is now larger
than ξ, the threshold in the absence of liquidity guarantees. This shift is also
depicted in Figure 3.4. The reason for this result is that banks have additional
liquid funds, even in case of a crisis: Because of the deposit insurance, they
always receive funds from new depositors, and their patient depositors never
have an incentive to withdraw early.
In traditional banking models, policy tools like a deposit insurance eliminate
self-fulfilling adverse equilibria at no cost. This is not necessarily true in our
model: once the shadow banking sector exceeds the size ϑ, a run in the
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Figure 3.4: Fire-sale Prices under Liquidity Guarantees. This graph depicts the
potential fire-sale price of securities in case regulated commercial banks provide liq-
uidity guarantees to shadow banks. The critical size above which multiple equilibria
exist moves from ξ to ϑ.
shadow banking sector constitutes an equilibrium despite the safety net for
commercial banks, and despite the liquidity guarantees of banks. Shadow
banks – by circumventing the existing regulation – place themselves outside
the safety net and are thus prone to runs. If the regulated commercial banks
offer liquidity guarantees, a crisis in the shadow banking sector also spreads
to the regulated banking sector. Ultimately, self-fulfilling adverse equilibria
are not necessarily eliminated by the safety net and may become costly.
Corollary 3.1. Assume that G(s∗) > ϑ, and assume banks provide liquidity
guarantees to shadow banks. In case of a run in the shadow banking sector,
the safety net for regulated commercial banks is tested and the regulator must
inject an amount
G(s∗)(1− pi)rsb −max[A, `] > 0. (3.25)
Proof. This corollary follows directly from the proof of Proposition 3.5.
G(s∗)(1− pi)rsb denotes the liquidity need of shadow banks in case of a run,
and max[A, `] denotes the amount that shadow banks can raise by selling
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or liquidating their assets. While commercial banks may cover part of the
shadow banks’ liquidity short-fall by fulfilling their liquidity guarantees, this
amount also has to be compensated by the regulator because otherwise banks
cannot serve their depositors in the future.
If the regulated commercial banking and the shadow banking sector are in-
tertwined, a crisis may not be limited to the shadow banking sector, but also
spread to the commercial banks, thus testing the safety net. Ultimately, the
regulator has to step in and cover the commercial banks’ liabilities. Therefore,
the model challenges the view that policy measures like a deposit insurance
necessarily are an efficient mechanism for preventing self-fulfilling crises. His-
torically, safety nets such as a deposit insurance schemes were perceived as
an effective measure to prevent panic-based banking crises. The view is sup-
ported by traditional banking models of maturity transformation such as Dia-
mond and Dybvig (1983) and Qi (1994). In the classic models of self-fulfilling
bank runs, a credible deposit insurance can break the strategic complemen-
tarity in the withdrawal decision of bank customers at no cost. We show that
this may not be the case when regulatory arbitrage is possible and regulated
and unregulated banking activities are intertwined.
3.4 MMFs, ABCP Conduits, and SPV
In the last section we presented a model in which the shadow banking sector
consisted of one vertically integrated, representative shadow bank. We will
now consider a shadow banking sector that offers credit, liquidity, and ma-
turity transformation to investors through vertically separated institutions.
This structure of the shadow banking sector (compare Figure 3.5) is exoge-
nous in our model. It is empirically motivated; we selectively follow and
simplify the descriptions by Pozsar et al. (2013). Altogether, the actors of the
shadow banking system invest in long assets and transform these investments
into short-term claims. However, we distinguish between different actors in
the shadow banking sector.
In our setup, shadow banking consists of special purpose vehicles (SPVs),
ABCP conduits, and money market mutual funds (MMFs). Investment banks
securitize assets such as loans (i.e., the long assets in our model) via SPVs,
thereby transforming them into asset-backed securities (ABS). Through di-
versified investments, they eliminate the idiosyncratic risk of loans and con-
duct risk transformation. Note that SPVs typically do not lend to firms or
consumers directly, but rather purchase loans from loan originators such as
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Figure 3.5: Detailed Structure of Shadow Banking. The structure of the shadow
banking sector is mostly exogenous in our model; we selectively follow and simplify
the descriptions by Pozsar et al. (2013). Shadow banking consists of special pur-
pose vehicle (SPVs), ABCP conduits such as structured investment vehicles (SIVs),
and money market mutual funds (MMFs). SPVs transform assets into asset-backed
securities (ABS) in order to make them tradable, i.e., they conduct risk and liq-
uidity transformation (securitization). ABS have a long maturity; they are bought
by ABCP conduits. ABCP conduits, in turn, use short-term debt to finance these
long-term assets; they sell asset-backed commercial papers (ABCP) to MMFs, i.e.,
they conduct maturity transformation. MMFs are the door to the shadow banking
sector: They offer deposit-like claims to investors, such as shares with a stable net as-
sets value (NAV), thus conducting another form of liquidity transformation. Finally,
there is a secondary market in which ABS can be sold to arbitrageurs.
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mortgage agencies or commercial banks.
SPVs buy long assets with idiosyncratic returns, transform them into ABS,
and sell them to ABCP conduits. The empirically motivated narrative is that
investment banks use SPVs to purchase loans from loan originators such as
mortgage brokers or commercial banks. These SPVs bundle the claims into
securitized loans (ABS), successfully diversifying the idiosyncratic return risk.
Securitization makes the long assets tradable by eliminating the adverse selec-
tion problem that is associated with idiosyncratic return risk. For simplicity,
we assume that the shadow-banking cost ρ occurs at this stage. Thus, the
ABS that are sold by SPVs have a return of R− ρ.
ABCP conduits purchase these securitized assets with long maturities (ABS)
and finance their business by issuing short-term claims that they sell to MMFs.
To put it more technically, ABCP conduits (such as structured investment
vehicles (SIVs)) purchase ABS and finance themselves through asset-backed
commercial papers (ABCPs), which they sell to MMFs.13 ABCP conduits
hence conduct maturity transformation. Maturity transformation is the cen-
tral element and the key service of banking in our model, and it is the main
source of fragility.
For investors, MMFs are the door to the shadow banking sector as they
transform short-term debt (such as ABCP) into claims that are essentially
equivalent to demand deposits, such as equity shares with a stable net assets
value (stable NAV). MMFs thus conduct liquidity transformation. Again, we
will assume that MMFs are literally taking demand deposits.
At the heart of the shadow banking sector is the maturity transformation
by ABCP conduits. ABCP conduits purchase securitized assets (ABS) from
investment banks’ SPVs. As described above, these assets have a return of
R− ρ and a maturity of two periods. ABCP conduits can finance themselves
by borrowing from MMFs via ABCPs. Moreover, they can also sell ABS
to arbitrageurs in the secondary market as specified above. ABCP conduits
may be legally independent entities, but they are largely founded and run by
regulated banks in order to engage in unregulated off-balance sheet maturity
transformation (Acharya et al., 2013). Because such maturity transformation
is very fragile, banks stabilize their conduits by providing them with liquidity
guarantees. In this section, we assume that ABCP conduits are fully insured
through such liquidity guarantees.
Investors can access the services of the shadow banking sector via MMFs,
13ABCP conduits also use other securities to finance their activities, such as medium term
notes. For simplicity, we focus on ABCPs.
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which are assumed to intermediate between investors and ABCP conduits.14
MMFs offer demand-deposit contracts to investors while purchasing short-
term claims on ABCP conduits.15 MMFs offer a per-period interest rate
rmmf to investors and purchase ABCP (short-term debt) with a per-period
return rabcp. Competition among MMFs and among ABCP conduits implies
that rmmf = rabcp = rsb. Investors face the same situation as described in
the last section, and the size of the shadow banking sector is again given by
G(s∗).
In the following, we will analyze the fragility of the different institutions
within the shadow banking sector. First, we will assume that MMFs have
perfect support by a sponsor and analyze under which condition a run of
MMFs on ABCP conduits constitutes an equilibrium. Second, we will re-
lax the assumption of sponsor support and analyze under which conditions
investors might run on MMFs.
3.4.1 Runs on ABCP Conduits
As in the previous section, we now study the stability of the shadow banking
sector. We analyze the subgame starting in period t under the assumption
that behavior until date t − 1 is as in the steady-state equilibrium specified
in Proposition 3.3. We again analyze the case in which banks grant liquid-
ity guarantees to the shadow banking sector, in this case to ABCP conduits.
Moreover, we assume for the moment that MMFs receive absolutely credi-
ble sponsor support, implying that investors will never run on MMFs. We
derive the condition under which ABCP conduits might experience a run by
MMFs, i.e., the condition for the existence of a run equilibrium in the period-t
subgame.
Proposition 3.6. Assume that the economy is in the second-best steady state
described in Proposition 3.3 and all ABCP conduits are granted liquidity guar-
antees by commercial banks. A run of MMFs on ABCP conduits constitutes
an equilibrium of the subgame starting in period t if and only if
G(s∗) > max[A, `] + 1(1− pi)rsb + 1 ≡ ϑ, (3.26)
14This is equivalent to assuming that investors face large transaction costs or do not have
the expertise to buy ABCP directly.
15A MMF typically sells shares to investors, and the fund’s sponsor guarantees a stable
NAV, i.e., it guarantees to buy back shares at a price of one at any time. As mentioned
above, the stable NAV implies that an MMF share is a claim that is equivalent to a
demand-deposit contract.
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where s∗ = f(γ, ρ). It holds that ϑ > ξ.
Proof. See the proof of Proposition 3.5. MMFs have the same type of claims
that investors had in the last section, and the ABCP conduits have the same
liabilities and assets, i.e., the same maturity structure, that shadow banks
had before.
Proposition 3.6 is the equivalent to Proposition 3.4. If commercial banks
engage in off-balance sheet activities, i.e., if banks themselves operate ABCP
conduits and provide them with liquidity guarantees, the critical threshold for
the size of the shadow banking sector is ϑ. Again, deposit insurance does not
eliminate self-fulfilling adverse equilibria at no cost. If the shadow banking
sector exceeds the size ϑ, a run in the shadow banking sector constitutes an
equilibrium despite the safety net for commercial banks, and despite the liq-
uidity guarantees of banks. By running off-balance sheet conduits and provid-
ing them with liquidity guarantees, banks circumvent the existing regulation
and abuse their safety net.
The equivalent to Corollary 3.1 also holds in this setup:
Corollary 3.2. Assume that G(s∗) > ϑ, and assume banks provide liquidity
guarantees to ABCP conduits. In case of a run in the shadow banking sector,
the safety net for regulated commercial banks is tested and the regulator must
inject an amount
G(s∗)(1− pi)rsb −max[A, `] > 0. (3.27)
Because the liquidity guarantees that commercial banks provide to ABCP
conduits induces contagion of the regulated banking sector, a crisis becomes
costly for the regulator.
3.4.2 Runs on MMFs
In the previous sections, we ruled out runs on MMFs by assuming that they
have credible support by a sponsor. Credible sponsor support means that
even if all investors withdraw their funds from an MMF, the sponsor is able
to provide sufficient liquidity to the MMF such that it can serve all investors.
Recall that we use the narrative that MMFs are literally offering demand-
deposit contracts. In practice, an MMF issues equity shares, and its sponsor
guarantees stable NAV for theses shares, i.e., it promises to buy these shares
at face value in case of liquidity problems.
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We now relax the assumption that the guarantee is always credible. We
explicitly model the credibility of the guarantee by assuming that the sponsors
have m units of liquidity per unit of investment in the MMF that they can
provide in case of a crisis. Moreover, we keep the assumption of existing
liquidity guarantees. We show that providing mG(s∗) units only credibly
prevents a run on MMFs if this amount is sufficient to fill the liquidity shortfall
in case of a run of investors on MMFs, which in turn triggers a run of MMFs
on ABCP conduits.
Proposition 3.7. Assume that the economy is in the second-best steady state
equilibrium described in Proposition 3.3. Assume further that all ABCP con-
duits are granted liquidity guarantees by commercial banks, and that per unit
of investment, MMFs receive m units of liquidity support from their sponsor.
A run of investors on MMFs may occur whenever
G(s∗) > max[A, `] + 1(1− pi)rsb + 1−m = ν > ϑ. (3.28)
If the ν > G(s∗) > ϑ, investors never run on MMFs. However, MMFs might
run on ABCP conduits, which then draw on the sponsor support.
Proof. Observe that once an MMF needs liquid funds because investors with-
draw unexpectedly, it will stop rolling over ABCP. Now, whenever the shadow
banking sector exceeds the critical threshold ϑ, a run of MMFs on ABCP
conduits is self-fulfilling, as ABCP conduits will make losses only in this case.
This is therefore a necessary condition for a run by investors on MMFs. If it is
not satisfied, MMFs are always able to fulfill their obligations by stopping the
rollover of ABCP, making it a weakly dominant strategy for patient investors
not to withdraw early. However, it is not a sufficient condition.
Observe that the resulting liquidity shortfall for the MMFs is given by
[(1− pi)rsb + 1]G(s∗)−max[A, `]− 1. (3.29)
Therefore, a run of investors on MMFs constitutes an equilibrium only if
mG(s∗) < [(1− pi)rsb + 1]G(s∗)−max[A, `]− 1. (3.30)
The result builds on the fact that sponsor support is like a liquidity back-
stop. If there is a run by MMFs on ABCP conduits, MMFs will make losses.
This additionally triggers a run of investors on MMFs if the sponsor is not
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able to cover these losses. Again, losses depend on the fire-sale price. The
fire-sale price, in turn, depends on the amount of assets sold in case of a run
by MMFs on ABCP conduits, which is determined by the size of the shadow
banking sector. If the shadow banking sector is so large that runs by MMFs
on ABCP conduits occur, but not so large that losses cannot be covered by
the sponsors, investors do not run. This is the case for ν > G(s∗) > ϑ. In
turn, if the shadow banking sector size exceeds ν, a run by MMFs on ABCP
conduits will always be accompanied by a run of investors on MMFs because
sponsor support is insufficient to cover losses in case of a run.
3.5 Conclusion
The main contribution of this chapter is to show how regulatory arbitrage-
induced shadow banking can sow the seeds of a financial crisis. We illustrate
how shadow banking activities undermine the effectiveness of a safety net that
is installed to prevent a financial crisis. Moreover, we show how regulatory
arbitrage may even induce the safety net to be costly for the regulator (or
taxpayer) in case of a crisis.
Our model features multiple equilibria. The key mechanism giving rise
to multiple equilibria is cash-in-the-market pricing in the secondary market
for shadow banks’ long-term securities which results from limited availability
of arbitrage capital. Cash-in-the-market pricing leads to depressed fire-sale
prices if there are too many assets on the market. The amount of assets is
thus crucial in determining whether shadow banking is fragile or not. In turn,
the amount of assets sold in case of a run on shadow banks is determined
by the size of the shadow banking sector. Therefore, multiple equilibria only
exist if the shadow banking sector is large.
As indicated earlier, our model lacks certain features that might be consid-
ered relevant that should be considered in future research. First, a financial
crisis is a purely self-fulfilling phenomena in our model, while fundamen-
tal values do play a role in reality. However, this chapter is an attempt to
demonstrate how the structure of the financial system can set the stage for
severe fragility: Because of maturity mismatch in a large shadow banking
sector without access to a safety net, small shocks can lead to large repercus-
sions. Second, by focusing on regulatory arbitrage as the sole reason for the
existence of a shadow banking, we ignore potential positive welfare effects of
shadow banking and securitization, such as catering to the demand for liquid
assets or improving risk allocation. However, the fragility that arises in the
context of regulatory arbitrage arguably also exists for other types of banking
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activities outside the regulatory perimeter.
Despite the simple nature of our model, we can still draw some conclusions.
Our key finding is that the size of the shadow banking sector plays a crucial
role for the stability of the financial system. However, the actual quantities
of shadow banking activities are not completely clear to academics and regu-
lators. Therefore, a first important implication of our model is that the size
of the shadow banking sector (or, more precisely, the magnitude of maturity
mismatch in the shadow banking sector) and the interconnectedness of bank-
ing and shadow banking should be variables that regulating authorities keep
track of. The Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2013 16 displays a
very valuable step in the right direction. Still, the report calls for devoting
even more resources to tackling concrete data issues. Our model can be taken
as an argument in support of this view.
We make a strong case for why regulatory arbitrage poses a severe risk to
financial stability. However, it would be wrong to conclude that regulation
should thus be reduced.17 One needs to keep in mind that – under the pre-
sumption that regulation is in place for a good reason – it is not regulation
itself that poses a problem, but the circumvention of regulation. If the regu-
lator insures depositors in order to eliminate self-fulfilling runs of depositors,
she may need to impose some regulation on banks in order to prevent moral
hazard. Regulatory arbitrage may eventually reintroduce the possibility of
runs. However, this does not alter the fact that it is a good idea to aim at
preventing runs in the first place.
Under the premise that regulatory arbitrage cannot be prevented at all,
our model indicates that financial stability may not always be reached by
providing a safety net and regulating banks. One may consider a richer set
of policy interventions that go beyond safety nets and regulation. E.g., the
government or the central bank may have the ability to intervene on the
secondary market in case of a crisis. However, such interventions are likely
to give rise to different problems as they may change incentives ex-ante, e.g.,
they may give rise to excessive collective maturity mismatch as in Farhi and
Tirole (2012). A richer model than ours would be needed to analyze such
effects consistently.
In turn, under the premise that regulatory arbitrage can be prevented or
can be made more difficult, we argue that it should be prevented or at least
reduced. Given that regulatory arbitrage can be very costly in terms of creat-
16FSB (2013).
17There are also argument against strict regulation, building on reputation concerns or
charter value effects, see, e.g., Ordoñez (2013).
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ing systemic risk, it should be made very costly to those who are conducting
it. While this may sound self-evident at first, a glimpse at the history of bank
regulation and its loopholes should be a reminder that regulatory arbitrage
and the associated risks have not always been a major concern.18
The regulatory response to the 2007-09 financial crisis has tried to deal with
many of the aspects in which shadow banking has contributed to the crisis
by circumventing regulation. However, it is less clear what arbitrage of cur-
rent regulation may look like, particularly because shadow baking activities
are of great and still growing importance, especially in emerging countries
such as China (Awrey, 2015; Dang et al., 2014). We argue that in a dy-
namic world with constant financial innovation, regulatory arbitrage is not
adequately dealt with by focusing on regulatory loopholes of the past only.
In contrast, prudential supervision calls for strong awareness and constant
monitoring of newly developing forms of regulatory arbitrage.
18See, e.g., Jones (2000) for an early analysis of how the Basel requirements were circum-
vented.
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Appendix 3.A Moral Hazard and
Regulatory Costs
In the model described above, regulatory costs enter as an exogenous param-
eter γ. In this section, we extend the model by a few aspects to provide a
foundation for this assumption. We show that once a bank is covered by a
safety net that is in place to prevent self-fulfilling runs (e.g., a deposit insur-
ance), the bank will not be disciplined by investors and will have incentives to
invest in a riskier project with private benefits. The regulator thus needs to
impose a minimum capital requirement in order to ensure that the bank be-
haves diligently. As raising capital is assumed to be costly for the bank (e.g.,
due to dilution costs), the overall return a bank will make will be reduced by
the regulation. We recommend reading this part only after having finished
reading Section 3.4.
Let us assume that commercial banks as well as shadow banks are run by
owner-managers. Assume that bank managers receive some constant private
benefit w (per unit of deposits) as long as their (shadow) bank is operating.
If the bank goes bankrupt, the manager loses his bank and his income. The
manager discounts the future at rate δ < 1, his discounted income over his (in-
finite) lifetime is given by w/(1− δ). Now assume that next to the short asset
and the long asset described in the beginning of Section 3.2, bank managers
also have access to an additional production technology that we call “private
asset”. This private asset is similar to the long asset, but it has the property
that, with some probability α, the asset defaults completely. In addition, this
asset produces some private benefit b (per unit) for the bank manager. We
assume that the long asset associated with a private benefit is never socially
optimal, i.e.,
R > (1− α)R + b. (3.31)
This structure is reminiscent of how moral hazard is introduced by e.g.
Holmström and Tirole (1997).
If the manager invests in the private asset instead of the long asset, the bank
still offers the same demand deposit contract as in the standard case. The
bank can serve its depositors with probability 1 − α, but with probability α
it defaults. We assume that investors can observe what the manager is doing.
However, this monitoring is associated with private costs for the investors. We
assume that these monitoring costs vary across investors and each investor i
has some monitoring costs si which are drawn from G(s). These monitoring
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costs are equivalent to the switching costs introduced in the main part of the
paper.
There are three different environments that a (shadow) bank can operate
in: In the first environment, the manager holds no equity and his depositors
are not protected by a deposit insurance. In the second environment, the
manager does not hold (inside) equity either, but his depositors are protected
by a deposit insurance. In the third environment, the manager does hold an
equity position e.
Let us consider the case without equity and without deposit insurance first.
The absence of deposit insurance induces investors to monitor the manager
and to withdraw (or not deposit) their funds if the manager misbehaves.
Therefore, the manager will behave diligently.19
In contrast, in the presence of a deposit insurance scheme, investors do not
care about what the manager is doing. If the manager has no “skin in the
game” (i.e., if he has no inside equity), he chooses the private asset iff
b > [1− (1− α)δ] w(1 + δ) . (3.32)
If this inequality is satisfied, the deposit insurance becomes tested, i.e. has to
cover claims, with probability α. The regulator therefore has an incentive to
ensure diligence of the manager by regulating him. While there are multiple
ways to regulate a bank manager, we assume that the regulation requires the
bank to hold a minimal amount of equity e per unit of deposits.
This changes the manager’s incentives. Because he now has “skin in the
game”, he will behave diligently whenever
e > b− [1− (1− α)δ] w(1 + δ) . (3.33)
By choosing an equity requirement e¯ ≡ b − [1 − (1 − α)δ]w/(1 + δ) per unit
of deposit, the regulator can ensure diligence.
Formally, incorporating this moral hazard and the resulting regulation into
the framework of banking and shadow banking in Section 3.4 works in the
following way: There exists a sector of commercial banking which is covered
by a safety net and regulated to prevent moral hazard. Bank managers have
to raise equity, and this is costly, e.g., due to dilution costs. We define the
cost of raising e units of equity to be the regulatory cost γ.
There also exists an unregulated shadow banking sector which is not subject
19For tractability, we abstract from the strategic interaction between investors which arises
because monitoring has positive externalities.
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to this capital requirement. However, there is a shadow-banking cost of ρ. In
addition, investors who choose to deposit their funds with the shadow banks
have to spend the monitoring cost si. As shown in Section 3.4, only investors
with costs si < s∗ will choose to invest in the shadow banking sector.
Appendix 3.B Heterogeneous Investors
In the main part of the paper, we assumed that all investors have the same
size (endowment of one unit). The heterogeneity among investors consists
in the switching costs si that are distributed according to some distribution
function G in the population. We argued that there are several reasons why
investors have heterogeneous switching costs, and that the only necessary
feature of the model is that switching costs relative to the investors’ budget
is heterogeneous.
In this appendix we want to show that we obtain qualitatively similar results
if we assume that all investors have identical switching costs, but different
endowments. For simplicity, let us assume that the investors’ endowment is
either high, xi = xh, or low, xi = xl. The fraction of “large investors”, i.e.,
with a high endowment, is given by p. The switching cost is assumed to be
identical across investors, si = s. For convenience, we assume that switching
costs are monetary, i.e., the utility from receiving c units from a shadow bank
is given by u(c− s).
For an investor with endowment xi, the expected utility of depositing at a
commercial bank is given by
EUb(xi) = piu(xirb) + (1− pi)u(xir2b ), (3.34)
while the utility from depositing at a shadow bank is given by
EUsb(xi) = piu(xirsb − s) + (1− pi)u(xir2sb − s). (3.35)
Again, an investor chooses the shadow bank if EUsb(xi) > EUb(xi). If the
endowments and the switching costs are such that EUsb(xh) > EUb(xh) and
EUsb(xl) < EUb(xl), all large investors choose the shadow banking sector,
while all small investors stay with the commercial banks. The size of the
shadow banking sector is thus given by the fraction of “large investors”, p.
And the size of the commercial banking sector is thus given by the fraction
of “small investors”, 1− p.
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